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DIS"ENTIITG OPINION

It Is a matter of deep regret to me that I em un

able to agree with my a.ssooiatep in all that is determined

in the Opinion and Judgment filed herein.
when I signed it with reservations.

That was indicated

One who disassociates

himself from a substantial part of an Oplnien and Judgment is'
under some oblig^^tion, it seems to me, to state the reasons.
Th^t is my present purpose.
The limited time available does not permit me to

indulge in elaboration, or ,to mention all the points of dif
ference with the Opinion. X must be content, therefore, in '
indicating in broad outline those differences of view which •
seem te me to be of major importance, g»me ureliminary oTbservptions by "ay ®f background for ^uch discussion may be
helpful.

The evidence in this case is not in sulBStantial

conflict, so far as it rel^^tes to the vital evidentiary facts.
For the most part, in spite of some difference in coloration,
-1-

the evidence for the Defens:e rounds cut and Fupplements the

picture given hy the prosecution.

The divergence of ^pinion

of the Tribunal arises chiefly from a difference of view as

to the interpretation of the evidence, and particularly as

to what inferences may properly be drawn therefr»m and as to
what facts mu't necessarily be shown to constitute guilt of

a particular crime, and the degree of proof with which it
must be establishedr

These matters will not be treated separately, or

in order, but my position, with reference to all of them, will
be expressed or illustrated in the course of this separate
Opinion.

It seems to me important also that we should re

fresh our recollection °s to some of the rights of an accused
and some dangers which mu^t be guarded again't to insure
Just verdict, and that will be di'cussed also.

Beginning with the judgment of the International

Military Tribunal decided-unSer the London Charter, and run

ning through all the deolaions of subsequent trlbunsle at

Nurnberg, vhlch were decided under Control Law 10, of v.hl
the London Charter 1' made a part, the following propositions
are clearly dl^-cernlble;

1. That guilt Is peif-onal end Individual and mu. t

t. »...a on tn. p.r~.sl .Oto of tM InOlfiao.l oK.rg.a

not oonotruouv. o, ooUeotlv. -o Mo. th. ofl.l..!

•'

slon .»a .0 ooatrol o,.r tnoo. -no aia 00-1. t„...
3 Tl... M
«»'" " """ """

.not .0. l.ai^iao.i a,„.a,n.
n., . .00..1 — " "
-E-

•

-V.

have performed it vjith the intention of committing a crime,

^^uoh act may be an act of omieaion where there is a duty to
act and power to prevent.

Crimea, generally rpeahing, are

intentional wrongs, the intentional re''ults of action or nonaction.

They

committed "wilfully ®nd knowingly as the In

dictment charges.

They are not the result of accident or of

V

circumstances over which the actor had no control and no

I

reason to anticipate.

3.

All the elements nece^j^ary to establish the per

sonal guilt of the individual charged must be proven beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

This last proposition means that the burden is on
the "Prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant, in

acGorc^ance with the preceding propo.^itions, by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.

It means th^=t in the meantime he is'pre

sumed to be innocent, and th^t such presumption stands as a

witness for him throughout the trial.

It means th^^t all the

material evicience must be co.n'"idered and if from the credible
evidence two inferences may be drawn, one of guilt and one

of innecenoe, the latter must prevail.

It means that where

circumstances are relied up»n to establish guilt, the ciroumstances must be so complete ©s to exclude' any other reason
able hypothesis.

These propositions are not a mere ooll.eotion of words
to be repeatedj, given lip service, and then ignored. They are
basic.

The ic'eas they repre'"ent mu" t be constantly kept in

mind if the rights of the accused are to be properly safeguarded
and the conviction of tho^e who m^y not have actually committed

the crime charged avoided. To ignore them end ^hat they require
of the Tribunal in the way of mental attitude at any stage of
-3-
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the pro-ce-e-dlngs ip to open the door to error and inju?'tice.
There ip a vest difference between evidence ^•^:hich proves a
• criine and th^t v hich confirmr a suspicion.
Unfortunately the Prosecution'? case

as, for the

mostj part, not presented either in the evidence or in argu
ment in harmony with these propositions and the concept which
they represent. ' For example, evidence as to all the crimes

Gommitted by the Third Reich, and they were many and horrible,

s

has "been introduced before us in all their gory detail-s, in

cluding movies of conditions in ?ome concentration camps tak
en after Allied troops occupied the territory, although it

is not charged that ^ny defendant in this dock had ?=ny direct
connection with or reFponsibility for "ach conditions.

It

is srgued thet the defendants are guilty of all these crimes
of which they received, knowledge, actual or constructiveMuch of the time of the trial was taken up with an effort to

prove -uoh knowledge, frequently by means of documents '.^hioh
are - hown to have reached their office. The theory is that
If ,a defendant knew of a crime anr^'Here in the government
and remained at hir po^t of duty, he thereby approved the

crime and became guilty of it. Of course, the s«me result

-would follow if 8 defendant by some document or otherwise took
.cognizance of H.P
the

fBot that
oiient. s crime had been committed unless

. he openly and vigorously protested against it. .

Other statements of the Prosechtion are more frank
e.nd realistic.

Witnes

P the following from a prosecution Brief:

-unless we subscribecrime
to the
Preposterous
'^hould
not be
fto^'foHf 4-onP
it for committed
by a.State,
P. Nation'^ crimes
those mu't atone i

g

ogenoies

pi""-"*"
+-v,4 riffle In febis case, including

This may explain many thin^in thi.
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the fact that the men v^ho seem to have actually committed

war crimes "by their own testimony a'^pear in this case, not

in the dock, but as witnesres for the Prosecution.
These attitudes reflect impatience with the idea

that these defendants, as individuals, must be shown to
have personally committed crimes according to the usual and
customary standards or tests.

They may also indicate a

realization that the evidence in many instances is insuf

ficient to establish guilt by such standards.

The^ repre

sent a concept of mass or collective guilt, under which men
should be found guilty of a crime even though they knew

nothing about it v^hen it occurred, and it was committed by
people over whom they had no re• ponsibility or control.

The theory seems to be that this concept applies with special
emphasis when the defendants held prominent positions in the
government of Germany when the crimes v;ere committed.

There are other arguments advanced to sustain con
vlotions on a mass scale, wihich, in my judgment, are even

more unsound on legal grounds and more vicious in their con
sequences. But since the Opinion does not mention them,
reveal the psrt they played in the decision, I shall not
tempt to discuss them. It is sufficient to say that I re
ject them all. Since Conspiracy is^out of this case, no

sort of legal legerdemain can substitute for proof that
defendant as an individual committed some act either
sion or commission with the intent thereby to bring

result Which i-^ a crime charged in the indictment, and which
accomplished its purpose. If the evidence is insufficient

to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basi- of

-5-
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f^uoh individual refponFibility, as distinguished from

group responsibility, this Tribunal has no other alterna
tive than to acquit.

'

All of these arguments and contentions in behalf
of the T^rosecution lead by somevJhst different routes to a

very simple formula for determining guilt as follov;s:

The

^

government of the Third peich committed many crimes; the

^

defendants held prominent positions in that government,
and knev) of some of the.se crimes, therefore, they ere

guilty.

It smacks more of ^^omething el?e than a proceed

ing to fix the legel responsibility for crime.

It is strange doctrine and reasoning to be ad

vanced by lawyers representing Americen Justice, and the
American concept of crime.

One excuse for it is that Con

trol Law 10 contains a provi^^ion that those are guilty of a
crime "who took a consenting part therein".

The phrase is interpreted to mean that by giving
consent to the crime after ,it was committed was to take a

conpentlng part, and that failure to either openly protest
or go on a sit-down strike in time of war, after receiving

knowledge that someliody somevhere in the government committed
a crime, was to consent to the crime and thereby become guil y

*

of it. It makes proof easy'end guilt almost universal.
Frankly, it i' incredible to me that such a con
tention should be advanced, and more incredible that it
should receive seriou consideration. It is wholly unreal
iptic. It has neither reason nor a rudimentary conception

of juatice to sun ort it. It does not even give nroper ef
fect to the language used in the Control law, and has no

surmort so far as I have been able to ascertain in ay of

-6-

the deoisione here at Kurnberg.

Properly aonstrued, this

phrase simply means that one- v'ho "took a consenting part",

:4k
•M

must be one who took a part in the erime and the consent

must Play a part in the crime.
the statutei

This is the language of

Consent after the crime, if such a thing is

possible,' could not play s part in the crime.

A failure

to openly object to a crime after it has been committed,
where there i- no right of objeotion, because of absence,

of jurisdiction in the matter, and where such objection

would, therefore, accomplish nothing, c.annot properly be
called "consent" at all, and even if failure to resign
under -ach circumstances after hearing about a crime can

•properly be called "consent" it could not play a V.fb ih
the crime. The phrase "take a consenting part" properly

construed is,not inconsistent with the idea of individual
responsibility for crimes. It is not inconsistent with
the idea that to constitute s crime there must he on the

part of the person charged'-some action or omission of duty
have a causal connection with the crime charged and under

taken with the intention of committing a crime. Any persoh
who can order a crime oomir.itted can consent to its commis
sion with equal effect and with equal responsibility.
TO take a consenting part means no more th-n that.

This is the only interpretation which makes sense.

It i^ the only interpretation which Is consistent with the
allegations of the Indictment that defendants committed
crimes "knowingly and wilfully". It
the only interpreta
tion Which is consistent with e pre'um-.tion of innocence,

and that personal end individual guilt must be established
beyond p rraponable c'oubt.
•7-

'
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MorebYer, Control Coancil Law 10 does not pro
vide thpt remaining in office after receiving knowledge
that someone in the gcvernment h^-s committed a

crime, is

in itself a crime, and the Indictment makes no such chargei t is not a crime and it does not in itself prove any other

crime.

Nor can it properly "be allowed to sustain a. con

viction, or motivate a conviction on some other ground.
In order to comply with the letter and spirit of

I

what has been heretofore stated, we must put out of mind
entirely the fact

that these defendants were recently mem

bers of a regime v.-hich we thoroughly disliked and with

which we were recently at war, and that > ome of them have
uttered offensive .sentiments against our country, its

leaders and its troops.

Ve must put out of mind entirely

all the crimes of their compatriots in v-hich they took no

part.

We must disregard all the evidence of such crimes

and the horrible details and pictures presented here in

connection therewith, all of which are inflammatory in

character and likely to arouse passion and prejudice.

The men in thi^ dock must be tried and judged on what they

did, and not on wh^^^t somebody else did.

They must be tried

solely on the evidence relating to the particular crimes
charged against them. They must be judged on fair and imBPrtial consideration of "11 the evidence rel-ting to their

guilt, and not on the personal beliefs of members of the
Tribunal, which are not established by the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. There must be no assumption on the part
of the Tribunal that it kno\«JS more about the facts than is

thus established by the evidence. Such detachment from all
of these irrelevant and inflemmatory matters, and oUch de

votion to the easentiais of a fair and proper tri.al must
be achieved, if justice is to be done.
-8-
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If there be those vjho reg^^rd ruch an approach
"v^'ith diefeyor, let them take cohort in the fact that it
repre'^ ents net only the lav; epnlic*=ble .to the yribunala, but
the ideal:- of ju-^tice of the people of the nation '^hich
sponsor? these trials, and .that a vast majority of those peo
ple T ould feel betrayed if convictions were b^^sed on any
cL' T

I

le'^ser standard,

'

'

Moreover, they should reflect on the fact that
If these trials have a reason for eyistence, it is to en
courage respect for the rules applicable to warfare.

Suoh

encouragement comes quite as much in freeing from punish/

'

ment thoae who are not shown to have vdlfully, knowingly snd
with criminal intent violated these rules as it does in

puni^'hing those who h^ve so violated them. Any suggestion

of constructive or collective guilt, no matter how disguised,
would, of course, ^unish those who did not individually and
personp>lly violate the rules equ^illy with those vjho did,

and thuj^ destroy not only ^respect for the rules but also the
whole legitimate purpose of the trials.

Any other approach to these trials or purpose in
pursuing them could not h^ve respect for law and justice as
Its object.
- It has seemed to me not only proper but 'necessary

to refer in this separate Opinion to the arguments and contentions in behalf of conviction hereinabove discussed be

cause of the light they may oast on many of the convictions
contained in the Tribunal's judgment;

Many of these convip-

tlons are incomprehensible to me except as .viewed in the

light of such arguments and similar lines of reasoning.

-9-
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Un-

fortunately the Opinion, long as it is, reveals little
of the process of legal reasoning which sustains the con
clusion.

There are other preliminary matters' which should
be briefly considered as an aid to a bettex' undex'standing
of the discussion of the law and the facts
to some

of the counts

of the

with referc>nc6

Indictment v/hich follow.

One thing which should be made unmistakably clear
at the outset is that this Tribunal is not a

stitution.

law-Liaking in

X violently disagree with the Opinion that we

are engaged in enforcing laternational law which has not

been codified, and that we nave an obligation to lay dov/n
rules of conduct for tne guidance of nations in the future.

Such a conception entirely misconstrues our function and
our power, and must inevitably lead to error of the gross
est sort,

it is not for us to say what things should be

condemned as crimes and v/hat taings should not.

all been done by the law-making authority.

That has

Control haw 10

gives us jurisdiction only of three crimes which are de
scribed ther-^in, namely;
(IJ Grimes against leace.

(2) vvar Crimes, and
(5)

Grimes against Humanity.

Crimes aoiainst Peace and Grimes against humanity

are defined by the Act.

v«ar Crlrnos are defined in part by

the Act and in part as violations of the laws and customs of
war.

Thero is no claim that there ar^ any laws and customs

of war applicable here except as contained in the Hague or

Geneva Conventions, or described in Control Law 10.

Thus

a definition or description of all the ciimes for vhich wo
ai's authorized to convict has been reduced to writing for

our guidance.

.Ji-v,

Vi<«l

"^•^•le have no power to reach out and condemn and

puniah anything and everything which we may believe to
be wrong.

Unles'

the sots of a defendant are a crime

within the terms of a statute or rule, we have no author

ity to declare them a crime,

in a case where the defend

ants are charged with violating these rules, we must be
careful not to violate them ourselves by declaring an act

to be 8 crime, which is not made a crime by these rules,

^

We are not enforcing uncodified international
law, and no one has been indicted here for violating an

^

uncodified rule of international law.

vrhere a crime de

scribed in Control Law 10, purports to be a codification

of a pre-existing rule of internaticnal law, and a ques

tion of interpretation arises, we may properly look to the
rule as it existed before such codification as an aid to

the interpretation.

Other than that, we have no concern

with uncodified international law.

Moreover, it must be realized that these rules
do not contain a complete code of laws which cover every

situation which may arise during warfare. Many acts which

we may regard as cruel and wrong, do not come within their
^

terms.

As profes'or V/echslar has said.
ttonoe the evil of war has been precipitated,
for the mof^t pert in the convention to

not?inrreLins but the fragile effort, em-

St the cruelty by which it ie conducted, "

The legal qur-tion, therefore, for ua to determine
if not whether a particular act ought to be a crime but
whether it ia a crime under the rule'^ applicable here, alI

w

ays keeping in mind that ve have no right to extend these

-11-

rules by constructioa.

It is the genera:, rule that statutes and rules
defining crivne inust be s trictly construed in favor ol the

accused.

This means that questions involving doubtful

oonstrucbion should

be resolved in favor

of the accused.

Other questions will be considered as'they arise
in connection with the

the

discussion of the

several counts of tne

Indictment,

convictions under

to whicn this separate

Opinion is directea,

I

i'-.y disagreement with the Judgment in this case
is limited to convictions wnlch I

believe to be either un

warranted or exaggerated and which, in my opinion, are not
justified by the law or the facts.

it will, tnerefore, be

necessary to discuss both the applicttble law and facts.

It wou^d serve no useful purpose and is obviously

impractical for me to discuss all the individual convictions
in all the counts •of the -ndictment'.

i shall, therefore,

discuss In connection with bnc several counts, to which this

separate Opinion is directed, only such individual convic
tions as seem

necessary to illustrate my separate view..

i.

5'"

mm
'Mi

-12-
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COUNT

ONE

COUI^IT ONE charpies the defendants' therein named

of Crimes Against Peace",
''in that ti ey j^articii-ated. in tno initiation
er invasions of other coiintries and wars of
aggression in violation of international Laws

and Treaties including but not limited bo

planning, preparation, initiation and v/aglng
of •'"'ars of a g'T're ssion, ^nd vars in violation
of Tftternational Treaties, Agreements and
Assurances

K

The Opinion and Judgment of the Tribunal con

victs the defendants wEISSA.LCiP-h, KEPPLEK, bOEIiMANN,
lAlWiEhS and KOEKNER of this charge.
I am unable to agree v/ith this judgment.

Rather than attempting to point out the points of dis
agreement with the Opinion on this Count, it v/111 be-..

simpler to present my viev;s independent of the Opinion.
TilP API LI CABLE LAW

At the outset. It seems important that, v/e con

sider the la\v appxicaole to the situation.

Not until

v/c know v;bat is necessary as a matter of law to con
stitute guilt, crn we intelligently consider the evi

dence bearing on the question.

Unfortunately, wc arc

met nerc -with a surprising lack of clarity in the

decisions, end with some uncertainty, and an apparent
divergence.of view.

Some confusion appears to have resulted from

the discussion in the cases, and some of it from

holdings without adequate discussion of the legal
basis therefor,

i shall attempt to set out in some
-13-
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detail, my own analysis of the legal situation and
my conclusions with reference thereto, and. tne rea
sons

therefor,

Ihc law which is the basis of our authority
is Control Council Lcv.^ No. 10, >^ereinaftcr referred

to as "Law 10," enacted by the four occupyin.i^ pov/era,
on the 20th of December 1945.
upon us.

I'hat law is binding

It is the basis for the Jurisdiction of

this Tribunal,

We have no power or Jurisdiction

with reference to any crime not described in that
lav;, and the description or definition of the crime

as contained in that lav; is binding on us.

Lav; 10 defines "'Crimes Ag.ainst Peace" in
Article II (a) as follows:
Crimes against Peace.
invasions

of

other countries

Initiation of
and wars

of

aggression in violation or international
laws f.nd treaties, including out noe lim
ited to plc.nnint>, prt^paration, initiation
or waging a war of aggression, or a v;ar
of violation of international treaties,
a^rrc-ments or assT^rances, or participation

in a common plan or conspiracy for tho
rACComplishmcnt of any of the. foreo-oiner,"
Some questions of interpretation arise at the

I

outset.

In the solution of these problems we must

look to the language of the Act primarily, and if
there is still uncertainty, we must look to the his

torical background In an effort to ari'ive at tho
true meaning.

It must be conceded that,while the Control

Council had power to enact any sort of lav; which it

desired, the obvious purpose was to provide machin
ery for the punishment of crimes which were thought
-14-

to be crimes under International Law existing at the

time, will be of

some help in the matter of interpre

tation where it becomes necessary to resort to inter

pretation.

CAN THERE BE A CKIf/iE AGAINST PEACE VaTHOUT V/AR?

The first question which arises is whether or not
there can be a crime against peace within the meaning

^

of Law 10 where there is no war.

This is important

for our consideration, because of the acts in Austria
and Czechoslovakia, where troops moved in and occupied
the country, but there was no war, and because of the
further fact that there are some convictions here

based on such actions.

There are several matters

which need to be considered in arriving at a proper

solution of this question,

(1)

In the first place, the London Charter,

which was adopted by the four occupying powers, and
which was the basis for the prosecution of the major

war criminals by the International Military Tribunal,
(hereinafter referred to as the

makes no refer

ence to "invasions" but referred only to "wars".
Law 10 states that its purpose Is to give ef

fect to the London Charter, and by Its terms, the Lon
don Charter is made an integral part thereof.

This

being true, the description of Crime against Peace
contained in the London Charter is also contained

in Law 10, and we thus have two descriptions
of the Crimes against Peace,

and the problem of

-15-
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I'oconciiing them,

This te^sk must bo ^.p^ro-'Chod '• Itli the assumi.-tion

by Lav' 10 tbore v.rr-g no IntTition to substantially
alter or change the \def'im,tion of Crimes against Peace

as contained in the London Charter, and incorporated
in Law 10,

(2) iVioreover, the IMT held that the invasions of
Austria and Czechoslovakia were "aggressive acts,"'

but did not hold that they wore "aggressive wars."
(3) Law 10, by specifically referring to inva-

^

siona and aggressive wars, recognizes that they are
not the same thing, so that v/o cannot say thrt war
includes invasions«

(4) As previously pointed out, j-uw ±0 obviously
attempts -co provide machinery for tn^ punishment of
crimes vhich were thonyrt to be crimes prior to its
enactment.

Some

of the authors

of the London Charter

•»

have declared that

I

i t did not

create ''ny nc"* Crime

against pcadc, but was merely a description or condificatlon of a crime against.peace, which existed
prior to its adoption.

^

The IMT took the same view, basing its conclu
sion for the most part upon the fact that some 63

I

nations of the world had agreed to abolish vjar as an
instrument of national policy, In the Kcllogg-Briand

Pact, and some other Trertlca of the same general pur
port,

feut such reasoning would apply only to wars,

because neither In the Kcliogg-brland iact, nor any

other Treaty, so far as I ar.i aware, is there any treaty
-16-
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or agreenent affecting the coimtries hare involved
with reference to i-nere invasions -- at least not

invasions accomplished under the circumstances under*
which -lustria and Czechoslovakia wor^ invaded.

The

thing which is prohibited by all of these Treaties
is war.

If we start with the premise that what was

intended was to describe crimes wh^ch wore already
crimes under International Law,

wo will have to

excludo Invasions, because there was no possible
!

basis for claiming that a

m^re invasion was contrary

to International uaw, prior to the enactment of Law
10,

(5}

An analysis of the language of Lav; 10 and

its grammatical construction does not support the
contention that a mere invasion Is a violation of its

terms.

ror oxamplo, it will be noticed that all oi •

th^ alternative acts vialch bhe -Sfcatut-j provides shall
each constitute the crime'arc separated by a comma,

and tho disjunctlvo word "or", whereas "Invasions of
'other countries" and "v;ars of aggression, etc." are

not separated but, on the contrary, are united by

the conjunctive word "and" whion, from a purely gram
matical standpoint, suggests thab both are necessary
to constitute

the

crime.

It has been suggested that such a construction

is unrealistic, because it would raean that, in order
for a war of aggression to be a crime against peace,
it would have to be acoompaniod by an invaslnn.

But it

must be remembered that Law 10, in giving these Tribunals

jurisdiction over certain described crimes, does iiot

purport to describe comprehensively all of the crimes
/'•
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that may exist under International Law*

Indeed i t

restricts tnem and restricts our jurisdiction both
in

time

and
Thi

in

torritorv.

1 t.

is nothing inconsistent, therefore, for

haw 10 to limit our jurisdiction only to such crimes
against peace as involved an invasion, first, because
the invasion, coupled with the war, helps to emphasise
its aggressive character, and ordinarily constitutes

the best evidence that the war Is one of aggression;
and, second, because nearly all of the aggrossivo wars
with which we have to deal, did include Invasions.

Such a limitation contained in Law 10, has no
effect in limiting International Law generally, but
only limiting bbe particular t7fpe of crime with which
v/o are

authorized

(O)

to

d-eal.

In addition, some rather absurd results fol

low an Interprotatlon that invasions of other countries

alone, and without v/ar, constitute a crime against po&oe.
For instance, if wo regard them as separate crimes, that

is, if we regard invasions of other countries as a crime

and wars of aggression in violation of International
Law and Treaties, as another crime, then any and all

Invasions, regjirdless of purpose, intention or cffjct, would
bj criminal, whereas, wars would be criminal only in the

event they wei't; aggressive, and in violation of
International Laws and Ti'eatius, anid if it is sug

gested that the phrase, "of aggression and in viola
tion of Intornafclonal Laws and Treaties" applies to invasions as

-18-
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well as to wars, we are confronted v;ith
the obvious proposition that thc;re are no such things
. as

invasions

in violation of International uaw and

Treaties, there arc no treaties by v/hich the nations
have agreed to abandon invasions and no jDossible basis
for the claim that an invasion without v/ar was con

trary to International Law prior to tho adoption of
Law 10.

As to wars, there may — and Indeed there seems
to be -- a difference of opinion as to whether initia
ting a war of aggression was a crime under International

Laiv, when the wars here involvc-d were started, but at
least there is substantial basis for such a

claim in

view of the fact that some 63 nations, had joined in
announcing the principle, and in a covenant to the

effect that they would not resort to war as an instru

ment of National policy, and thab Germany was a party
to that covenant.

There is nothing of that sort so far as mere
invasions are concerned,

(7)

Furtheimoro, it is very difficult to under

stand how any act can properly be described as a Crime
against Peace, which docs not constitute a breach of
the peace,

ktio are sometliucs inclined to talk about

the "crime of aggression", wnoi-caa the Statute speaksof "crijiies against peace".

Confusion rusults.

Neither

the Statute nor the Tre^:.ti33 on which it is based con

demn aggression.

It condemns wax- for the purpose of ag-

-19-
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grcssion.

war.

acts may be aggressive that are short of

Tney may merit the condemnation of all right-

thinking people, but unless they involve a breach of

the peace, it woula be an abuse of language to call thciii

"Crimes against Peace".
P'or all of tho foregoing reasons, X have
reached tho conclusion that what happened in Austria

and Czechoslovakia, whoru tns troops of Germany marched

in, but there was no disturbance of the peace, and no

war, does not constitute a Crime against 'Poacc.
WHEK

IS TEE ChXiViE AGAIl'ST PEACE COUPLETL?

In view of the

claim made in the Opinion that

all those v/ho participated in a v/ar of aggression know

ingly, are guilty of Crimes against Peace, considGration
must be given to the question of what the crime is, and
when it is complete.

In other words, aru those who par

ticipated in a war, alter it has coi!ir,.onccd, cither on
the economic, diplomatic or military front, or in any

other way, guilty of Crimes against Peace.*'
The Prosecution, in its Brief, contends that

the word "waging" as used in the otatute, means partic

ipation in the war in a substantial manner.

The Opinion

gives no explanation as to the reason for its conclusion
that such participation is a Crime against Peace.
I do not believe that a correct interpretation

of the word "waging" as used in Bav/ 10, leads to the
conclusion that participation in the war, after it has

commenced, is a Crime against Peace., .according to Law

10, the Crime against Peace consists in "initiating" a
war of aggression. The terms "planning", "preparation"
-2 0-
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"waging" are only means by which the war is gotten
into motion.

The Prosecution, in its brief, takes the posi

tion that the v/ord "waging", as used in the Statute,

means something entirely different from "preparation",
"planning" and "initiation".

The principle of ojusdem

generis, on the other hand, would suggest that it has

^ somewhat similar meaning, or is at least related to
the previous words.

ahcn the Statute provides that "waging" "is
included in "initiation" it must, is seems to me, be
given sucn meaning as relates it to initiations.

This is clearly stated in Uaw 10.

'

'

If w^.s not

so clear under tht, teriiis of the Charter, and yet it
was given such moaning by the IwT tvon under the
Charter.

it has been claimed that there is some language

in the ILT judgment decided undor uhc provisions of the
London Charter with reference to hcenitz, which
appears to support a contrary viev/.

If so, it is of

minor Importance in view of the numerous and definite

expressions in that judgment, even as it relates to

Loenitz, which shov/ a contr^Lry view.
ifor example, at tne very outset of the discus

sion of "The Comiaon rlan of Oonspipacy and ^iggresslve
/

war", the Tribunal, after saying trnit war was an essentlally evil thing, states;
"To inxtiato a war of aggression, therefore.
Is not only

international crime. It is

the suprarae international crir^.e."

-21-

A review of tho fr.cts stated by the IMT to

support a conviction of waging an aggressive v»?ar,
reveals that the emphasis is all placed upon v/ha.t
the dei'cndant did oeforc the war started, not afterwa rd.

For example, in the c^.se of G-ocrint?, the

Luftwaffe which he commanded, and which raised havoc

during the vjar, is hardly mentioned in connection

with Crimes against loace committed by him.

The sub

stance of his acts, which support, his conviction, is

contained in the last paragraph of the Tribunal's slim
ming up for Goering as follows:
"After his own admissions to this Tribunal,

from tho positions which he held, tho con
ference he attended and the public words

he uttered, there can remain no doubt that
Goering was the moving force for aggressive
war, second only to Hitler. He v.'as the
planner, and prime mover in the military
and diplomatic preparations for war which
Germany pursued."
In like manner, an examination of the facts

st-^.ted by that Tribunal, to establish f^ullt of other

defendants, shows that the emphasis and the facts
which led to a conviction were activities of the

defendants in bringing about the war, not in fight
ing it, or in participating in it in any way after
it

came

into existence.

Even in the case of Docnitz, a careful examina

tion of the case against him, as str.tcd by tho Tribunal,
will show that it was v;ha.t ho did before hostilities

actually broke out, and in reviving them after they were

in fact over, that led to his conviction.
-22-

iii'ter stating the things that Docnitz did not
do, the Triounal makes this statement:

"Docnitz did, however, wage aggressive v;ar
within the meaning of that word ns "usod hy
the Charter; subnarino warfare v-^hich began

immediately upon the outbreak of the war
was fully coordinated Vifith the other branches
of the Vi/ehrmacht,
It is clear that his

U-boats, few in number at the time, were
fully prepared to wago war." (Emphasis added)

Then, aft er further statements concerning the

influential positions of Doenitz, occurs this very
significant statement:

"As late as A.pril 1945, Yjhen he admits ho
knevv' the struggle was hopeless, Docnitz,
as Commandor-in-Ghicf, urged the Navy to
continue its fight.

On the 1st of May,

1945, ho bcca.me t}K. Hoad of State, and,

as such, ordered the '>ehrmacht to continue

Its war in the East until capitulation on
the 9th of May, 1945."

This is the final fact statud by the Tribunal

In the case against i^oealtz, and it must have been

regarded by the Tribunal as of the highest importance.
Its obvious purpose is to sbov/ that,even after the

war, which bcgm in 1939, was in fact over, Doenitz
ordered further and continued attacks,

if this state

ment serves any purpose, it is to show that he, in
effect, by what he did, initiated a now war, or
revived one.v/hlch v;as already over,

i

• • If '"waging" in the sense of fighting a war,
or merely participating In a war, was sufficient to

establish his guilt, why was it necessary to refer

to this fact in order to connect him with the initia

tion of a new war, or the extension of a war already
in existence, after it was, in fact, over?
-23-

This, it seems to mo, clonrly demonstrr.tos

tbp.t, in the opinion of ths.t Tribunp.l, sonetbing
more. thA:n participating in a \vr.r ?^lready initiated

was necessary to estciblish waging witbin the meaning
of Law 10,

This conclusion becomes even more imperativo

yNhon it is considered that Docnltz commanded the-sub
marines and thr.t these submarines vjrought terrific

damage and destruction all during the course of the
war*

Yot this fact is not even mentioned in connec

tion with Crimes against icaco.

If waging war, in

the ordinary sense of participating in the war, con

stituted guilt, these facts would establish it ocyond

peradventui-e or doubt.

It wouia -i:,ve oeen wholly

unnecessary to refer to the fact that be had his sub
marines ready -and in a position to strike in advance
of the actual outbreak of the v/ar and that be revived
the war after it was otherwise over, and to base their
judgment on these facts*

The Prosecution cites some authorities which I

think support the view that the word "waging" referred
to in Law 10 docs not mean

participation in the war

after It is started.

For example, Justice Jackson is quoted as saying
the follovang:

'•Our first task is to examine the means by
vJhlGh these defendants and their fallow con

spirators,prepared and incited Germany to

go to war."

It is oovious that statement must have been made
in the trial before the IMT'. irofessor ^ecbsler
-24-
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is also qiiotea as saying this;

"I'he greatest evil Is, of course, the
i n i t i a t i o n of war

itself.

Once

the

evil of war hns been precipitated.,
nothing remains but the fragile effort
embodiod for

the most part in the con

ventions, to lixnlt the cruelty by which
i t is conducted."

I'his clearly shows that the initiation is

thoup-ht to be the crime, and the. b, so far as pe.rtici'
pation is concorned, nothing ror-mins bub the conven

tions to govern it.
Joreovci*, whore a statute codifies pre

• - Tiy*
•

existing law, i t is customary to look to the pret

existing law as an aid to interpretation,
ation is not unlike that oxisting where

law is in effect.

Tno situ

the common

if?cquently a legislature will

abolish common law crimes, for example, and then

enact a Statute defixiing a crime briefly which
existed at common law.
tice

in such instances

It is the universal prac
to look to the common Is-w

definition of the crime to aid in tho construction
of the Statute.

Here we have a onc-soiitcncc definition of an
International Crime which was said to exist under

Intcrnatlcnal Lav^r before the definition was adopted.
•t

'

For a iiiorj vjxaot definition, especially on a
point which may not bo clear, v/e c-rtalnly have a
right to look to wnat constltu! .a tint crime under

International haw, as it exlstcu prior to'the adop
tion of th^;

Statute, especially v/nere, as here, it

was the intention to adopt a description of a crime
previously e:jclsting.

-25-

The reason why wars of aggression were held

to he a crime against International Law, prior to
Law 10, Was because to start such a war ?;ould be to

violate the Kellogg-3rland Pact, under which the
Nations agreed to abandon war as an instrument of

National policy, and other Treaties of the same gen
eral purport.

Under that Pact, what v;ould be the

crime and when v/ould i t be complete ?
If the Treaty prohibited the use of war as an

instrument of National Policy, it seems obvious that
the

Pact would be breached when the nation resorted

to a war of aggression or to serve any other National
policy,

hn agreement not to rosort to war as an

instrument of National Policy is breached only b:^
resorting to war, and th. brerach is complete when
war has begun.

The offense, then, under this pre-existing
International Law, would consist in creating a con

dition of war.

Tiiore Is nothing In that Treaty, or

in any of the other Treaties of similar purport,
which makes it a crime to participate in a wur after
i t comes into 6Xistence»

when a Nation finds Itself at war, and its

very existence is at stake, tixero is nothing in any
of thorjo Treaties which even remotely suggests that

It would be a crime for the' citizens of either coun

try, under these oonditlons, to participate in the

war and to wage war to the limit, so long as they conform to
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the conventions in the conduct of war. So when vife consider
the hackground of the Statute, and the reasons advanced tr

support the findings of the BIT, that is but a re-enactment
of pre-existing International Law, we are forced to the
conclusion that those who participated in the war, after it

has been started, even with knowledge of the true character
of the war, are not guilty of waging a

v;ar of aggression.

Finally, there is a concD.uslve reason why it must
be said that those v/ho associate themselves v/lth a war, .

after it is started, cannot, on that account, be guilty,
and that is the very language of the Lav/ 10,
the

It defines
,sVj

crime as:

"Initiation of i^'.^msions of other coimtries

and wars of aggression in violatiw^n of inter
national laws and treaties,-' etOo

When the Statute says irir".tiaticn is the crime, v/hat right
do we have to say that participation is also a crln.e?
The word "v/aging", as used in the Statute, is re
ferred to by the IMT as participation in a plan to v/age

vmr.

It refers to the preliminary procedure up to and

including the outbreak of v;ar, not the participation in
the war,

after it has been initiated,

PEFSOhS CAPABLE OF CGMi'-'ITTIBG CHIj/IES
i

AGAINST PEACE

One further legal question must be considered here.

We have already called attention to the statement of the
IM" that it ic the initiation of wars of aggression, whioh

are the supreme orir^es.

V® have called attention to the

'V^

fact that under the law existing prior to the London

Charter, or Law 10, the offense would consist in resort
ing to war as an Instrument of national policy,

-27-

diiid

/T

\i<L have called attention to th- v/orklng of
Law 10, which described Crlmos against f's..acc as the
initiation of invasions of other countries and

wars of aggressiOxi,

etc.

The question th^n arises, "V,hat action, and
by

w^hon, may

be said to constitute the crime of

initiating a war of aggression?"
whether or not a

The question of

nation will wage an aggi'essive war

is a question of national policy.

Obviously not

everybody in the natioa is in a position to participate
in th-: formulation of such

a policy.

Vihat-evcr

many of thom do, as.indi\iduuls, is so devoid of
significance or effect that it would be wholly
unrealistic to say that tnoy wcri- s

factor in deter

mining the policy to wage an aggressive war and
therefore guilty of initiating a war of aggression.
The IMT, in its judgment concerning the defend
ants who were convicted, lays emphasis nob only on

their attitude -and partlcipation in a plan to 'wage a

war of aggression but also on the relation of such
defendant to hitler and the opportunities they had

and the capacity they had to

influence hatioiial pol

icy tlirough hitl-r.

The comments of that Tritunal are equally sig

nificant with reference to some of tho dof^.-ndants who
mV'.

were acquitted.

For example, take tho case of Fritzsche#

Ho

not only drllvcr^d tho hally Paroles to tho Press,
which directed the propaganda campaign in the Press, and
w
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which wore obviously very important in conditioning

the minds of the German people for v/ar, but ho subse-

(^cntly delivered radio addresses.

These he apparently

prepared himself, yet the Tribunal held him not guilty.
It did not even go into tho question as to whether he
know of a

plan to v/are a war of aggression.-

It speaks

of FritzshS'tJs lack of position and influonco in tho
Third Koich, and the further fact that he had never
had a conversation with Hitler.

It thus appears that

position and influence, and standing with Hitler,
v;er0 thought to bo important, in order to play a

part in initiating a war.

Of course, more proximity to Hitler, such as
a secretary or-adjutant v/ould have, would not" be
controlling.

But in viov/ of the power Hitler had,

It is a factor in determining whether a person partic
ipated in tho initiation of n war or not.

To

participate, requires, in addition, a position of
pov;er and influence, and the use of it, for -the pur
pose of initiating a war, knowing the war will be one
of aggression.

There is another thing about the holding as to
Pritzschc that is significant.

The Tribunal said he

was but a conduit for the transmission of tho D'^ily

Paroles, and that he prepared and formulated dally
radio Paroles "according to tho general political
policies of the regime*.
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1'his suggests fchr.t people v/ho are in r. sub-

crdlnr.tc position, find who merely cr.rry out tasks

assigned them, according to the generrl political
policies of the Nazi rcgir. e, arc not in the class

of people v.'ho can be said to have knowingly and

v/ilfully participated in a plan to wage a war of
aggression,

suggests a auostantial limitation

on those who may properly oe said to have committed
crimes apiainst peace*

The Tribunal in the P^rbon case in considering
this question said in substance that the lilT had

placed the dividing lino just bclcv: the policy-making
level. In other vvords, only those persons who were on
a policy-making level could be liable for the commis

sion of crimes against peace.

•'"hiE statement was reaffirmed, at least in
principle, in the Krupp case, and again in the High
Command case.

These holdings arc rcrsuaslvc and I

think they arc correct.

""ho then are the pc-oplc on the poxic^-making
level'.'

A comprehensive definition will not be attempted
This much may, howrvrr, be said on the subject.

Only

those arc included, regardless of title or official

position, who, by reason of their position of povyer,
arc able to exercise,,as a. matter of free choice Influ

ence on ihc govornmcntrl policy, so far as the
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question of p-.oing to wr.r or rofr^.ining from going to
war is

concorncd.

The attitude

or actions

of others

would bo v/ithout significance or effect, and they

could not, therefore, bo said to have been a party to
the initiation of a war.

As to each defendant, -chere-

forc, we must seeic tne answer to the roxiov;ing three
questions:

(1) Did be knowinp'ly engap-c in some activity
in support of a plan or purpose to induce

his government -to initiate a v/ar?
/

(2) Did he know that the war to be initiated
was to be n v/ar of aggression?

(3) ?i/as his position and influence, or tho
consequences of bis activity si\ch that
his action could properly be said to
have had some Influence

or .effect in

bringing about the initiation of the
war on the part of his government?

Only if all or tnese questions are ansv/ered

in' the affirmative will ¥/e be justified in finding a
Crime acrainst i'acc has boon commltte'^.

It appears without question that t^c wars in
connection with v/hich some

of the defendants in this

case have been convicted v/cre wars of aggression.

It

vjas so found by the IMT, and there is no occasion to

discuss that question further.

There la, as previously

Indicr.tod, a question as to v/hether there v/cas any

^31-

aggressive war In Austria and Czechoslovrkla, whcro
German troops marched into the country.

But this

question tas previously been discussed.

There remains,

therefore, for consideration, only the question as to
whether the evidence establishes the guilt of the

defendants according to the tests above outlined.
It seems to me unfortunate that the opinion
quotes a statement of the I?vfr vhich v^as made with

reference to the Conspiracy Count.

The Defense in

that case had argued that there could not be a com

mon plan or conspiracy in a Dictator'ship, because the
Dictator alone made the plans.

The Tribunal, In dealing with this question,
in effect snid, with reference to those vjho were

fully advised of Bitler's plans and purpose, that
those with knowledge of his plans, who gave him

their aid, were liable.

The statement, standing

alone, and without reference to the context, and
the fact that a common plan or ocnspiracy was under*
discussion wbcn the statement was made, is mislead
ing.

In the f5.rst place, it must be borne in mind

that Hitler*s plsn therein referred to v;as the common

plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war -- a plan
which the IMT hold must bo concreto and definite and
not too far removod from the time of action.

Also

the "aid" referred to was to help bring the plan
into realization by the initiation of the war
involved in the plan.

It does not include the per

formance of the normal functions of a civil servant*

Obviously, that statement cannot properly and
-32-

litero.lly -be applied to anyone cnai-ged in this Count.
I'his IS not a conspiracy Count.

I'ue Conspiracy

Count, which is COUKT I'-.O, has been dismissed and it ^
has thereby been ndjudicated t>-at the defendants were

not parties to any common plan or conspiracy.

What

the defendants are charged with is what the IR-IT called,
"waging."

-^'hat is participation In a plan or a pur

pose to initiate a v/ar, knowing that it was to be a
war of aggression.

YiTSIZSAECICSR

Vi/EIZSAECKER is convicted because of his alleged

participation in the initiation of the invasion cf

Czechoslovakia, or that part of Czechoslovakia which
remained after the Sudotcnland had oeen ctded, and
Slovakia had declared its

independence.

In my view, he Is not '^uilty for tv^'O reasons.
One, the inve.vsion of Czech cslc.vrkia v^as not a Crime

against Icace, because there was no war, and no dis- *
turbancQ of the peace.

Two, he took no part in bring

ing about or Initiating such a,n invasion.

The first proposition has already been dis
cussed,

I

turn to the

second.

The Opinion states in substance that iIjEIZSaEOKEK
did not originate the invasion, a.nd forcible incorpora
tion of Hohemln nnd Moravia, and that wo do not believe

he locked upon the project with favor.
In spite of this concession, ho is convicted.
The Opinion states, in substance, that altheUi^h the
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defendant WKIZSAECKS^ was not present at the Confer

ences where Hitler announced plans of aggression, he
became familiar with them from

reliable sources, i.e.,

Hibbentrop, Canaris, leading generals of the Cbhrmacht
and others,

who furnished him with accurate informa

tion.

lhat is

the f i r s t

I

have heard in this

case

of

any such claim and, so far as X am aware, there is no

evidence to support i\;.
received some

It is true, of course, that
information as

to what was

actually going on, which.may not have been generally
available, but it has not been suggested heretofore,
tiiat he received information vtrith reference to these

conferences, where the corrimon plan and conspiracy to

wage an aggressive war v;ero formed.
It is significant that on such an important mat
ter no evidence is cited or referred to in support

of the statement.

in the opinion that

Si^=nlficantly, it appears elsewhere

nniiilZSALCiliXi was not in nibbentrop's

confidence and that they did not get along very well.

It is my judgment, based on the evidence in

this case, that '.^LIZSAbCiuit *S knowledge of planned,
future developments in the field oi x'oreign Policy,
as it affected war, was limited to inferences which

he was able to draw from what was going on about him.

This was consistent with the^secrecy regulations,
which were rigorously enforced in the neich, and

which provided that no one should be told of what was
being done or planned with reference to matters of
-34-

- /•;

this sort, except whrt r>n official nip-ht be toli whet

was necessary for him to knov; in order to perform his
duties.

But only so much vjas to be told as it was

necessary for him to know, and not that until the
time came when he must know,

tor example, V/EIZSAECICER was not told of the

planned invasion of Denmark and Norway until about'
three days before the invasion occurred, and after

the German troops bad departed, and was told then
only because it was necessary for the Foreign office
to prepare and communicate a stat-wrnent to oe delivered

to the Danish and Norwegian governments.
Now what IS the evidence on wl'.ich the Opinion

• -M

relics to convict i''/FIoSAFC^''EK which indicates that he
aided In the Initiation of the invasion of Czechoslo

vakia?

^''Jhat he did before the marching in of the

German troops, according to the Opinion, is the fol
lowing.

He received a memo from itibocntrop of an

interview with Hitler I'hich' had to do ivlth the rela

tions with Hungary.

It does net indicate that Hitler

had any intentions of military action against
Czechoslovakia.

The balance of the evidence consists

of memos of interviews v.dth representatives of r'orcign

Governments^ such as Britain, Irance, It-aly and ozecho-

Slovakia., concernxng a guor^.nty, whlcn Germany had
agreed to a-lve in the Munich Agrconent.
In ^11 of these, interview^ 'i'/ETZS,A^'C''ElR tried to

avoid, excuse and justify th^ failure -^.nd refusal of
' -55-
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his government to enter into such c gur.rnnty.

But v;hr.t

did all of that Inve to do with the invasion v:hich follov;cd?

If the guaranty had been entered into, 7/ould the
invasion have been less likely to follov;?

Hitler v/as

not enbarrassed by Treaty obligations in his other cara-

paigns.

V^hat reason is there to suppose that he vvould

have been I'estra.ined by this one, ospecic.ily since the
so-cclled. invasion or niarching in of troops was carried

out in acoord'^nce v/ltb, or as a result of, an agreement

on the part of the Frcsi'^cnt ".nd t^'C Foreign Minister of
Czechoslovakia,

But even more important than tb-'"t, what could
VvFIZSAECICER do about itV He was not in charge of the

Foreign policy of the ^Miich.

It was not for him to

decide v/hcther such a guaranty should be entered into
or not.

He could not control that.

his government

did not want to enter into such a guaranty, he could
not compel it to do so.

It would be vholly unrealistic to supiose that
ViEIZSAFG:''Eh had any control over such matters.

did not make the polxcy.

i.e coaici oniyi rc-floot the

facts as to vjhether or not his i-roiei'ni:ient was willing

to enter Into such a crupranty.

All be could do, and

all be did '^o was to make t>u best case in behalf of

his Governncnt thr.t he could, end th^-t does not indlcatc any purpose or Intention, on his part to encnur-

ago a military assault on Czechoslovakia, nor did it,
in fact, encourage such an assault.
-36-
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These interYiews do not appear to have had any
connection whatever with Haoha's visiting Berlin, and

with his suhmit ting to ^Hitler'-s will, and his -opening
the door for the entry of the German Array, nor doeg it
"appear that they were intended to have such purpose.
These interviews did not Initiate, and had no connection

with the initiation of that proceeding, and they are in
no way connected with i t .

The Opinion then sets out a number of interviews

with these same Foreign representatives, which ViffilZSAECKER'
held following the absorption of Czechoslovakia, in
which he defended the action v:hich his Government had

taken, and claimed it was the result of an agreement

between the two states, and that other governments had
no grounds for complaint.
The Opinion seems to lay stress upon what' happened

subsequently, and to draw from it the conclusion that

WElZiSAECIiER played a consenting part.

There is a sugges

tion also that what WEIZSAECKER did following the absorp
tion of Czechoslovakia, was an implementation of the
enterprise.

'I am unable to support this line of reasoning.
If what happened with reference to Czechoslovakia was

in fact a crime against Peace, lAfEIZSAECKER could be found

Guilty in my judgment, only if he affirmatively did some
thing to initiate the enterprise, a nd did It with the
intention of initiating the enterprise.
that sort is entirely lacking.
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The opinion reveals that y*EIZSAIjCKER had played a
heroic part in an effort to preserve decency and peace.
Because he was silent in this instance he is convictod,
although evidence is lacking that ho had advance notice

of Hitler's purpose sufiicient to eno.ble him to attempt

anything effective to prevent it, if indeed, there was
anything he could have done under any circumstance.

but, in my judgment, his failure to" do anything
to prevent the proceedings, even if he had had an op

portunity, cannot be regarded as a crime.

He does not

commit a crime against peace in any event, by inaction.
Something affirmative is required.
It is not possible to examine and discuss the
other convictions unu^^r this Count in detail, and no

useful purpose would be served therc;by.

It is suf

ficient to say that not in any of then is there any
evidence to show that tne defendnnts did anything

affirmatively to initiate a war, iniowlng it was to
be a war of aggression.
WOERMNN was the head of the political division

in the Foreign Office, and as such, subordinate to
WF-IZSAECKER and to Kibbentrop.

He is convicted be

cause of certain diplomatic messages ho sent which
are described in the Opinion.

The only ones which

relate to a possible futur'e war are those sent to

Slovakia.

They are obviously messages which orig

inated with the H.rmy and have to do with coordinat-

ing military action in case of attack.
The Foreign Office is, of course, the only appro-
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priatc channel of communication between nations.

In

transmitting those messages the Foreign Office acted
merely as a transmission line.

It is hardly to be

supposed that these messages represent V/OERM^ro*s

plan.

Ha was not running the Army, nor planning

military cooperation with Slovakia in case of attack.
It was a proper precautionary measure in any event.

But it was in fact, as we know now, a preparation for
attack on Poland. - But it was disguised as a defense

arrangement.

It was so represented to Slovakia, and

there is no reason why WOERM.'»N H should have rdcognizcd
at the time that i t was an act of preparation for a

war of aggression against Poland. . But if he had'

recognized it, I do not see what ho could'have done* about
it.

He was a subordinate in the Foreign Offico.- The

Foreign Offico v/as available for such communications
regardless of what WOERM/aW ^lay have thought about the
matter,

.

.

.
!

Hone of the other matters cited in the opinion

have a nything to do with initiating the v.'ar against

Poland,

Indeed, many of them are concerned wiiih events

happening after the war was over.

For instance, there

is a message sent by him stating that a certain Polish
Bishop would not be permitted to return to Poland after
the war.

This could have no connection with initiating

that war, in any event.

Moreover, the message merely

conveyed the decision of his aovernmcnt.

It v/ould be-

wholly unrealistic to suppose that it was up to VvOERM/HH to decide whether the return of the Bishop should
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"be pormitted or not".

This and many other like Items of evidenco cited

in the Opinion seem to indicate that the controi-ling
consaderation, sc far as the Opinion is concerned, is
whether or not y in v/hat the defendant did, ho acted in
sympathy with the Rolch program or in opposition to it.
And

if

It

can be found

that the things he did are

in

harmony with the Keich program, no matter how innocent

tho acts In thomselves may bo, the opinion seems to
hold that he then cooperated vjith or inplomonted such

program.

Of course, under such a formula, one may be

held to participate who merely writes a letter or re

ceived one, or forwi\rds a report, no matter hov/ harm
less

thoso documents may be in themselves.

in my judgment, the field is not that open.

To

bo guilty, - I repeat, - tho defendant must have
participated in the initiation of c war of aggression.

In order to do'that, he must have com^wit ted. some act
intended to have sonio effect in oringing about a war,
knowing it woiild - bo a war of aggrossion.

That kind,

of evidence is conspicuous by its absence here.
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KEPFIER

As to I^PPIER, his cictivltles v^ero In Aus

tria, where there was no v/ar, and this, in itself,
in my judgment, is a complete defense to the
charge•

Moreover, there Is no Indication that ho
worked there with a view of initiating a wnr«

His job was to seek a union v^ith Austria by

peaceful means* Since all the political parties
in Austria favored a union, it was not unreason

able to suppose it could bo acccmplishod»
The conditions requisite for such .a union

had already been accomplished pcfore the German

troops entered Austria. A government fav able
to such a program had been cst"bllshed before
the troops moved in.

That KEPFLER did not favor the entry of

the troops is shown by his statement quoted by
the IMT. Vi/hen Gooring telephoned KEPPLER to

have Seyss-Inquart send a telegram requesting

German troops to enter Austria to prevent blood
shed, KEPPI.ER replied:

"vVoll, SA and SS arc marching through
the streets, but everything is quiet."
This Indicates pretty clearly that KEFPLER
did not favor the entry of German troops and that
he believed i t unnecessary.
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The Opinion does not cite any facts or

ovidoncc to support the proposition that KEPPIiER

initiated, or helped to initiate, an invasion of
Austriuo

His guilt seems to consist in an inter

ference with Austrian affairs»
Crime against Peace® .

t

I

.

r

,,
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But this is not a

'as fco tlie defendants who were convicted be
cause of thein

activity in the Pour-Year Plan, it

does not appear that they Imcw that preparation \^s

being made for an aggressive v/a'r. There is no doubt
that the Four-Year Plan, at least in its later stages,

was engaged in preparation for war on a rather largo
sonlo, but every nation engages iu military prepara

tions.

Such preparations are as useful for defense

as for aggression.

Hitler, up to the outbreak of the v/ar in 1939,
repeatedly declared that such preparations were for

defense, and there was great emphasis placed on the

danger which confronted Germany from without. Those
who engaged in production of armament and military
prcparntlon aro not liable lanless they do so for the
purpose of preparing for a war of aggrossion. Proof
of this essential fact is lacking.

The same consideration, of course, applies to
other kinds of defense preparations, such as defense

councils and defense committees, and other types of
civil and government organization.

li^MMEHS is hold largely because of bis prep

aration of decrees and other documents for Hitler. The
nature of his v;ork and the liabilities of one who

merely formulates decrees and other o±ficial documehts, is discussed under COUNT SIX of this separate
'Opinion,

It is sufficient here to say that he was,
-43-

in the words of the Prosecution, "Hitler *'s faithful
servant" exorcising clerical and secretarial functions

and drafting decrees as a technician in that field.
Ho was the office chief of Hitler's office, as

Chancellor, and served Hitler in the civilian sector
of Government.

Hitler had other offices through

•which he exercised other functions, including mili

tary functions.

policy.

li'iMRIERS was not concerned with

He exorcised no policy-making functions.

Vi/hlle ho held the title
honorary.

Secretary.

of Minister, it was purely

He exercised the functions of a State

Ho cannot properly "be said to hnve

"been

on a policy-making level, or to have exercised any
influence or povjer in the direction of initiating a
war.

In my view, none of the defei:idatits convicted
under this Count can properly be held to have partic

ipated in a plan to wa.ge a war of aggression, or of
exercising any

activity v^lth the intention or pur

pose in vlevj of starting or Initiating such a v;ar,

and if such a construction could possibly be placed

on their activities, it docs not appear that they

had any influence or effect in bringing about a
state of war.

Neither they nor their activities

appear to have had any influence on Hitler. They

k
•f

were not the people on whom Hitler relied for guid

ance and support in such matters, and their -actions
were without significance, so far as the initiation
of the war with which they are charged, is concerned.
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•COUNT THREE

COUNT THREE charges the I^efendants therdin -named
with participation in the murder of prisoners of war and

belligerents engaged in the war against Germany.
RITTER

RITTER is allugod to have participated in such

murders because of two incidents, to-wit:
\

(1)

the murder of ^^lliod fliers;

(2)

the Sagan murders.

The murder of sillied fliers refers to the lynching of

^..lliod fliers who bailod oUt of their pianos after alleg
edly making machine gun attacks on civilians on the

highways or in the fields, while flying at low altitude.

In the interest of brevity they will bo referred to here
moroly as, "Alliod fliors'^

That such incidents occurred, and thet allied fliers

woro lynched and murdered, and that such acts were inde

fensible murders, la well established.

If it be conceded
I

'

that these >.llicd flio-rs had mode attacks on civilians as

claimed by the Defense, the remedy was not lynch murders,
Thuy wore entitled to bu taken as prisonurs of war and if

thoy committed war crimes, they were subject to trial and

punishment in cccordanco with the rulus of the Hague and
Gonovd Conventions. There was no excuse- or justification
for murdering thorn.
r--"

Our task hero is to determine whether the defendant

RITTER had any criminal rosponsibility for such mudors.

It would seem almost, suporfluoua to suggest in a legal
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opinion that a person to be guilty under this charge musthave himself murdered prisoners of war or ordered others

to do so, or at least performed some act or non-act which
had a eausal connection'with such murders and was performed

v/ith the intention of causing or assisting in causing such
murders.

RXTTER became attached to the C^erman Government as

a civil servant before the First World War.

Ho served first

in the Cclonial Office. He was a soldier during the First
World War. He joined the Foreign Office in 1922. His work
there was mostly in the field of economics and in connection
with oommercial matters.

He worUed on reparations after

the First World War, and negotiated many Trade Treaties

subsequently for Germany. He became Ambassador to Brazil
in 1937. He was withdrawn from that position due to Party

opposition.

had roaohed retirement age, and asked to

be retired, but was not permitted to do so. He was made

Ambassador for Special Assignments in the Foreign Office. _
After the war broke out he was made liaison offxcor

between Ribbentrop, the Minister, of Foreign Affairs, and
Keitol, the head of the Armed Forces. Ihe functions of

that position arc Indicated by the title. His dob was to
maintain contact or liaison between these two top officers,
and to facilitate communication between thorn. For that

•purpose ho maintained field headquarters not too far removed
from either. He had no authority to determine policy, or to
^^r>f>r.rnlrp- uolicy cither for the Foreign
make any decisions concerning
poxi ^
THa nurposo of liaison was to 1® op
Office or for the Army. The purpo
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each informod In matters which ooncorned both and to

facilitate negotiations between them> and to enable the

^wo officers to bettor coordinate their efforts.
It is no doubt true that whore difforencos aroso

ho was free'to make suggestions, and did make suggestions
with a view to enabling the parties to roach, a common
agreement or understanding,

-If

On 15 Juno 1944 RITTSR rccoivod from Kcitol, as

stated in the opinion, a proposed program of procedure

I-

concerning the mistreatment of killed fliers, and Loitol
requested the opinion of the Foreign Office v/lth refcr-

. encc thereto.

The Foreign Office vjas naturally consulted

^because it would be required to answer protests received
from the protective pov^ers of enemy countries.
This comriunication requested the opinion of the

Foreign Office by the 19th.

On the 18th Rlttor telephoned

that the opinion of the p'oreign Office could not be dollvorod by the 19th because it would bo necessary to contact
•

^

Berlin.

/

»

On the 25th of the month RITTSR wrote to Keitol's

office, trana.ultting:

"For your preLiminary information, tho draft ,
of a reply to tho Chief of tho Suprumc Command
•f tho -.rmod Forces in ansvjcr to his letter of
the 15th of Juno.
The draft has boon submitted

t® the Reich Foreign Minister,
Since the Reich Foreign Minister is av/ay on
travel for sovural days, he was not able, as

yet, to give his approval to the draft."
This draft had RITTFR's nrmo typed,at tho end

of

it, and was.obviously prepared in the form of a letter to
bo sent by HITTER, but HITTER drew a lino with a pen through
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his namo and marked it "draft", and wrote a sopa^rate lotter enolosing it, as above stated.

RITTER's conviction is baaed on his alleged author

ship of this draft, or his 1:ransmittal of it to Keitel^s
office.

Ohe draft is an oxpert^legal opinion and deals

particularly with thu tjoneva Convention, and the rules

developed thereunder.

It bears every ovidonco of having

been prepared by an oxpert in that field.
1

suoh an oxport.

KITTER was not

His specialty was economics.
/

Wo witness

I

testified that RITTSR prepared it.
did not.

•

He testified that he

The circumstances all confirm his statonont.

Theno-^is the circumstance that he tolephonud that

the attitude of the E'orolgn Office could not be trans

mitted until he oontnctod Berlin.

There is the long delay

in'forrnuiating the Foreign Office opinion.

There Is the

fact that Roitcl asked for the Foruign Officers opinion,

and thc.furthvr fact that the draft did contain the Foreign
Office's opinion, as Ribbontrop's subsequent approval shows.

There is nothing whatever In the aviSonco to suggest thct
RITTER prepared it.

The opinion relics wholly upon the fact that it
board a stamp of having boon in his office, but th^t

oiroumstanco proves nothing as to where it was prepared.
Thcro was no claim in the trial or in the argumunt that

the markings, or rbsonco of markings on the draft had

signlficanco. It appeerfi for the first time in tho opinion.
under such circumstances it is a pretty slender road on
Which to hang a conviction.

It is true that the draft, although making several ••
f'
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•bjootions basocl on- International Lavj, docs rocito that

tlio Poroign Office agrees in principle, but as will here

after appear, Ribbontrop had already ,agreed in principle,

Ihis fact was unknown to, HITTER and this Is another cir
cumstance which Indicates that Ribbontrop's office pre
pared the draft, or that it was done under pre-ttj'' close

supervision by Rlbbontrop, and that HITTER did not pre

pare it.

It seems to mo that the finding that RITTER

prepared the draft is contrary to the cvidonoc.
The Important thing, however, is that nothing
came of th^ draft.

It had no consequoncc whatever.

RlTTER^s communication to Keltel's office,gave notice

that Hibbcntrop's approval was subject to Hitler's
approvcalj and that he would not give his final approval

until Hitler had approved.
y/\. •.

It further appears, without dispute, that Sonn-

Icltncr, of Rlbbontrop's office, was to present the matter

to Hitler,

This olroumstanco suggests that he may have

had something to do with tho proparatlon of the draft.

In any event when it wa-.s presented to Hitler, Hitler said

it was "nonsense", apcordlng to Rlbbontrop's testimony
before the IMT, and nothing vjas cvur done about it.
never wont into effect.

because of-it.

It

IT® orders wore over issued

it could not possibly, under any oircura-

stancos, bo the cause of th^ murder of .llied fliurs,
'

»

There is anothur ciroumatance which shows that 1
V,''l

hitter teok no part in the forviiulation of any policy with
rcfcrenGO to Allied fliers. On the 28th of ;iay, Jodl
asked Hitter about the radio campaign then being put on
by Goobbols, with reference to those Allied fliers, and
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what was propar to be dono to resist thorn,

HITTER replied

that ho "should apply to a legal expert".

\

s

.

.

The manner in which this policy of lynching of
Allied fliers was initiatod and dovoloped is clearly

shovirn in thu 'evidence, and it clearly appears that RITTER

had nothing whatever to do with it.

The IiIT, in its judg-

1

mont concerning Borniann stated:

i

"Bormann is responsible for the lynching of
Allied airmen.

On the 30th of May, 1944, ho

prohibited any police action or criminal pro-^

%

coodlngs against persons who had taken part
in the lynching of Allied fliers, ^hls was
accoinpanlod by a. Goebbols propaganda campaign
inciting the German pocplc to take action of
this nature and tho conforenco of the 6th of

Juno, 1944, vtfhoro regulations for the applica
tion of lynching wore discussed."

'
•i
r:.-

''

Tho same Tribunal, in its judgment against Hibbon-

trop stated:

"von Hibbentrop part'iclpatod in a mooting

Juno 6, 1944, at which it was agreed to start

a program under v^hich Allied avi: tors, carry
ing out machine gun attacks on civilian popu
lation, should bo lynched.
V. .

This conference was hold with Eitlor at Hitler*?

headquarters, and Kcitel and Jodl of tho Armud Forces,
as won as Rlbbontrop, wore „In attondance. This oloarly

domonstratos thut th. Porylgn Office,or rather Rlbbontrop,

tho Foreign Minis tor, had agrood to this general policy
on the 6th of Juno, at a oonforoncu which Koitol also at-

• tended, so that vhon Koitol addrossod tho communication

t. Rlbbontrop on Juno 15th, it «as not t. sook his opinion
about tho gonoral'policy> but'rather tho details of a pro
gram to put tho policy into uffwct, -.nd thiS involves

toohnlcal procedures upon which RITTSR obviously was not
qualified to act, and did not attempt to act.
^50-
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On th.e 4th of Julyj Hitler issued the following
directive:

"Aoc«rding to press reports the /^ngla-iimerleans
intend to subject to air attaohs, small locali-'
ties without any war, economic or military
value,as a reprisal against V-1. In the event
this report proves true, the Fuehrer orders that
notices be served by v;ay of radio and the press
that every enemy aviator who is•shot down while
participating In such an attack^ is not entitled
to treatment rs a prisoner of Yi?ar, but that he
will be killed as soon as he falls

hands.

into German

This rule shall apply'to all attacks on

small localities which constitute neither mili

tary targets nor communication targets, etc.;

and are, therefore, of no military significance.''
As stated in the opinion this order was actually
put into effect and became the official policy.
It will be noted that-this statement of Hitler's

provides ho machinery of any kind for determining whether
Allied fliers who bailed out had attacked civilians or

n®n-milltary objects, and it contains no definition of

"non-military" objects.

The inevitable result was to

ma^ke all bailed-out fliers subject to : ttack according
to the judgment or opinion of the attaicker.
The opinion of the Foreign Office which HITTER

tra-nsmitted would have been an improvement on this,
but It had no effect.

and discarded.
it

It was declared to be n®nsense

This order of Hitler's had its origin

in the Hermann action, and the Conference of the 6th of

June.

It was uninfluenced in any v;r.y by any document

which HITTER even touched.

My conclusion Is that HITTER played no part in
^ I

I#•;
V• '

this transaction, except the normal function of lic.isonj

that he performed no act, not even of liaison, v>;hich has
u causal connection with the death of any lillied fliers
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and that -what he did, indicates no criminal intention

-whatever, and I am unable to follov/ the reasoning
vjhich leads t© the conclusion, that he is GUILTY of

participating in multiple murders.
SAGLU LfJ-PDERS

STEENGPu'.CET AI-ID HITTER

In connection

"with this incident not only RITTER

but also STEENGR^^CHT, who vas then State Secretary in the

Foreign Qffice, are convicted, - HITTER because it is
claimed he helped prepare a diplcraatic note, and
STESHGRAGHT because It is claimed he dispatched it.
It is doubtful if the Indictment charges any

such crime against STEEUGR.CKT, r.fid it Is certain that
it does not against HITTER.

Unfortunately, the Opinion attempts to abstract

rather than to quote what the Indictment charges in

COUMT TI:rES, and by the process of reversing the order
of statement, greatly enlcrgea the scope of the charge.

Vftiat.the Count charges has already been stated in sub
stance, but in visv of the confusion at this point, and
in aid of r. better understanding, it may be well to
quote it verbatim;

•%s: •,

SS®iv». otwJ p»=on.. ™ th.
S,t.2."i»9 to ao,
oo»ltt.d w„ ergot.,
SPaSSooa
"
as delinea in j-rtiol.
^participated
in atrocities
n?fenLr"JaL.it prisoners of war and
Sri.. Ot notion.,

mt.-v.ni -Rfilch or ware under the belligerent control

3'v«'

or military occupation by Germany, including
Ill treLment, enslavement, brutalities,
Ld other inhumane acts. Prisoners oi
"^°:^^fLV?i«erent3
war and belligerents were starved, lynched, branded

U'f
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shackled^ tortured and murdered In flagrant
violation of the lavi?s and customs of vjar', and

through diplomatic distortion, denial and
fabricated justification, the perpetration of
these

offenses

and atrocities was

concealed

frem the protective powers.
The defendants
committed \«ar Crimes in that they were princi

pals In, accesaorlos to, ordered, abetted,

took: a consenting pa.rt in, ^joro connected v;lth
plans and enterprises involving, and were mora-

bors of organizOvtlons and groups connected with,
the commission of YXr Oriraes."

It will bo noticed that what is charged hero is

participation in the murder of prisoners of war and bolligeronts of countries at war with Gcrma.ny.

f^ll other allega

tions are but moans by vjhich it is claimed the crimes were
committed.

The Indictment is so framed that the first prragraph

of each count charges the crime.

In succeeding paragraphs

is stated, by way of a Bill of Particulars, what each defend
ant did t© constitute his guilt of such charge.

The legal

sufficiency of such statements in the sub-paragraphs to

sustain the charge Is, of courso, a legal question for the
Tribunal.

Sub-paragraph 28-C is the one which describes the
acts of STEEiTGFLiiCHT and HITTER which it is claimed consti

/

tute their guilt and the opinion specifically finds them
guilty of the crimus sot forth in said paragraph.

It is as

follows :

"28 (o): In March, 1944, approximately fifty
officers of the British Royal ^>ir Eorco, who escaped
from the camp rt Stalag Luft m
whore they wore
confined as prisoners of war, vjoro shot on recap

ture. Thu (Gorman Foreign Offico was fully advised
and prepared "cover up" diplomatic notes to the
Protective povjer, Switzerland. Thadden of the

Gorman i-'broign Offico wrote to Hagner, a subordinate
of thu defendant STEKi^'GRt-C*:^, stating that a commun

ication was being sent to Groat Britain via Switz

erland to the effect that, in the courso of a search,
'a number of British and other escaped officers had
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to bo shot as thoy had not obeyed instructions when

caught". In furtherance of this policy to shoot
escaped prisoners of war upon recapture, th<- defend
ant RITTER, issued a warning notice, disclosing
the creation of so-called ^doath zones* for the

alleged protection of *vital installations* wherein
*all unauthorized persons will be shot on sight*.

A letter from the ^erman Foreign Minister to the
defendant RITTER in July 1944, stated that the

Fuehrer v^fas in agreement with the German Foreign
Office communication to the Swiss Embassy concern

ing the escape of the prisoners of war from Stalag

III, and that ho further agreed to the issuance of

the warning notice and the forvjarding of such a

c©mmunication to the ^wiss Embassy.

It will bo noted that this paragraph does not charge
STEEiJGRixCHT with having done anything.

It simply charges

that someone wrote a letter to his subordinate •

It charges

RITTER only with having written warning notices of danger

zones, a charge on v/hich, by the opinion/ he is acquitted.
It has been the settled view of those Tribunals that
no defendant should be convicted on a charge not mentioned
in the Bill of Particulars contained in the sub-paragraphs
of the Indictment. Indeed such would have to be the rule if
Indictments are to moan anything. Otnerwiso, RITTER vi/oul

appear to defend
/

under COUNT THREE for having posted warning

notices of danger zones in prisoner of war camps> and
himself convicted of an entirely different charge. That is
what has actually happened.

TRIHJN-X I In Caso I (Doctor's case) stated tho rule
as fallows;

Sln.l

IP

for tho follovJlng reason.

soou-

• two and throe of its xndio
, such a
•Unn
fAeeted
to
frame
its
pleading
,
tion el€
ov^arsio all defendants with the

oSLlon of war

^fm^lo

n^'^in^arsubilaragraph doalins with medical
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oxporlmonts, only those defondants particularly

charged with responsibility for each particular
item.

"In our view this

:

constitutoel in effect, a Bill

Particulars, and was, in ossonco, a declara
tion te.tho defondants upon which thoy woro on-

titlod-t® roly in preparing their defenses, that
•nly such persons as woro actually named in the
designated oxporimonts would bo calie d upon to
defend against tho spocific items. Included in
the list of names of those defendants specifi

cally charged with responsibility for the malaria
oxporimonts, the name of ROSE does not appear
"Wo think i t would bo manifestly unfair to tho

defendant to find him guilty of an offense with
which tho Indictment affirmatively indicated ho

was not charged."
If wo are to follow this rule,.- and thoro is no

reason why wo should not, - thoro should, on that account,
bo no conviction here as to either STEEITGFL'.CET or RITTER,

and ospecially not RITTER.
But, passing that, tho evidonco does not warrant
a conviction in any caso.
It is probably unnocossary to say more about tho

facts than appears in the. Opinion, in order to demonstrate

that neither STEENGRi^CHT nor RITTER is shown to be guilty
of participation in tho murdor of those unfortunate Brit
ish prisoners of war who had escaped from prison.

But

boforo approaching that question, some correction and supplomontation of the facts sooms appropriate,

it vi/ill then

appear, I.think, that thoy are not guilty of anything.
Complaint is made in the Opinion as to the notes

sent to Switzerland as protective power for Great Britain.
Both woro introduced as rebuttal documents (Exhibit C-372)
which, when considered in connection with the absence of a

specific charge against STEEI^GR/.GHT and the complete absence of
a charge against RITTER with reference thereto, raises a fur

ther question as to the propriety of considering them
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In connection with a substantive, affirmative charge against
thei» defendants.

on 26 May, the German Foreign Office received an

inquiry from the Swiss government, as protective power

for Great Britain, about the reported death ef British
prisoners of war who had escaped from a prison camp in
March, preceding.

It was HITTER*s task, as liaison man with

the Armed Forces, to investigate this matter.

Q?here is no

indication that he had ever heard of it before receiving
this assignment.

Keitel denied any knowledge of the matter, but gave

some indication that these prisoners had escaped from

prison camp and were captured by the police.

HITTER then

contacted the police and was furnished perfect records,

showing these men were shot while resisting arrest.

AXbreoht, the head of the legal division of the Foreign

Office, had been summoned by Hlbbentrop from Berlin to Salz
burg, where Rlbbentrop maintained his headquarters, to prepare
a reply to this Inquiry from the Swiss government. RITTER

i

thought these records of the police were a "swindle" and so
advised Rlbbentrop and Albrecht. He told the police the same

f
1

thing, and they did not resist the Idea very strongly.
Albrecht prepared the reply note.

The opinion con

victs RITTSR largely because Albrecht says he prepared the

note after talking to RITTER. Of course he talked to RITTER.
He would hardly prepare the note at Rlbbentrop-e Invitation

without talking to the man who Investigated the facts. There,
is no claim that RITTER deceived him. He could not report

anything more than what had been reported to him. He told
Albrecht What the police reported, and also that he thought
It was a swindle. V<-hat more could he do? And after the
note was prepared, both Albrecht and RITTER advised Rlbbentrop
-56-

not to send it.

Ribbentrop,. of course, as Foreign

Minister, completely controlled "wliat note, if any, should
be sent.

HITTER had no control over that.

\Yhat Ribbentrop did with it, and whether or not he

sent it, and whether or not the no to in evidence which ap-^
parently came from tho British Foreign Office files vi/as

the one Albrecht prepared, does not appear.

But, assuming

that it was sent, and that the copy in evidence is a true
i

copy of what Albrecht prepared, RITTER has committed no
crime.

Vlfhether or not STEENGRACHT dispatched the note at

Ribbentrop*s orders, or had anything to do v/ith it, does

not satisfactorily appear.
notes in evidence.

No names are attached to the

But if ho did send it, as the opinion

states, it was by order of Ribbentrop and without any
knovjledge as to its incorrect statements.

At least the

evidence fails to show ho had any knowledge that i t con
tained incorrect statements.

(

As to the second note it does not appear that
RITTER had anything to do with that.

^

STEENGRACHT has some

recollection of it. But it was obviously a high policy
matter for which Hitler and Ribbentrop were responsible.

At least it does not appear that STEEHGRiiCHT prepared it
or dispatched it.

The opinion seems to take tho view

that because ha stated ho had no clear recollection of
it, that such statement is evidence that ho did send it.

It thus appears that neither RITTER nor STEENGRACHT

had any part in a deliberate fabrication of a falsehood to

be sent in a diplomatic note to Great Britain.
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STEENGRi-.CHT

had nothing to do with the preparation of the note and
was

not informed as

to

its

incorrectness when at

the

direction of the Foreign Minister, he dispatched it,
if he

did dispatch it.

HITTER reported truthfully and fully as to the
facts revealed in his investigation,

the note.

i^lbrecht prepared

Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, controlled

the matter of sending it after being fully advised as to
the facts as was possible at the time.
But even if i t be conceded arguendo, that RITTER

and STEENG-RRCKT deliberately and intentionally played a
part in sending a false note,

the crime would not be par

ticipating in the murder of the British prisoners of war,
which took place some two
of

months before they ever heard

it.

It later came to light, and is now known, that
Hitler issued a direct order to the police to run.down

these escaped prisoners of v/ar and kill them.

There is

no suggestion in the evidence that RITTER or STSENGRixCIIT
knew this at the time these notes were prepared and dis

patched, or that they had any other information than that
contained in the note prepared by ii.lbrecht at Salzburg.
I am unable to follow the reasoning which leads
to the conclusion that STEENGRi-.CHT and RITTER are guilty

of narticipating in murders which occurred two months be

fore they heard of them, or took any action with reference
to them.
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VJhat has heretofore been said in the discussion of

the case against HITTER and his alleged participation in
the murder of ^..llied fliers,

is equally applicable to other

defendants so charged in Count Throo, including the defend
ant Li-ILlhRS.

He is charged, because of a letter he wrote

to the ilinlstor of Justice on June 4th,

^

transmitting the

circular decree of Bormann dated liay oOth.

^

In transmitting this decree E'lJiSHS ivUs performing
the normal

functions of the Chancellory.

It was a

sort

of secretariat vhich served the Chancellor much as any

secretarial orgc.nizatlon would serve thu liead of a govern
ment-

It was the proper avenue through which approaches

wore made to the Chancellor, and was the viechanism designed
to distribute comirunioatlons of all Hinds from the Chancellor

to the Ministries or other agencies of government,

t

LiilljhHS, as ho^-.d of the secretarial organization
known as the Chancellory, had no right to decide what he

(

would or would not distribute,

matter.

he had no choice in the

in performin,; that puruly clerical or ministerial

task, he could hardly be chr.rged with criminal intent in
any situation.

Ho gave no ordurs, and of course, had no

authority to do so.

He did call attention to the rospoot

in which the docroe mir;ht bo applicable to the operations
of the Ministry of Justice.
If the ivlinisti^'- of Justice- did anything as a result,
it was done because of tliu decree of Bormann, not because

-59-

of IiklvH'ffiiRS's letter transmitting it.
But the conclusive circumstance that LuMIviSRS'

letter, even if it led to the dismissal of prosecutions

of people who had engaged in Ij^nching (and there is no
evidence that it did) could not have thereby encouraged

future lynchings, is the fact that the police had al
ready been prohibited "from interfering with lynchings,
and this "was accompanied by a radio campt-ign. (See

quotation from IMT, supra) The dismissals, therefore,
if there were any> wero the result of c~ public policy of
authorizing lynchings, not the cause of it.

It can

hardly be claimed that the letter had any causal connec
tion with the lynchings which had already taken place.
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BERaER

BERG-ER is. convicted of participation In the murder of

the French General, Hesny, a prisoner- of war.

That General

I'lesny V7as brutally murdered in reprisal or revenge for the
elleged shooting by the French maquis of a Germa.n Genera.1,

and that this was done on direct order of Hitler, given to
Keitel,

there can be no doubt.

Our task is to determine

whether or not defendant BEKGER had a.ny criminal responsi
bility for the crime.

BERGSH held many positions in the SS.

He was Lieuten

ant General in the SS and the Waffen-SS; liaison officer
between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Reichs Minister for

the occupied Eastern territories; Cha»J8.f of the political

dii'ecting staff of the Reich I^iinister for the occupying
Eastern territories; Supreme Military Commander in Slovakia
in 1944, and Chief of the PoatE.1 Censorship,

He obviously

could not devote all of his time to any one of them.

In

addition to these tasks, he was made Chief of Prisoner of

War Affairs under Hiramler, and subordinate in th"t function

not only to Hlmmler but to Keitel, and of coursey Hitler
as well.

The office had previously existed under that same

name, Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs, in the organization

of the Army,

BERGER, upon his appointment, assumed thcit

"tiitle so that the terra Chief of Prisoner of 'War Affairs,
fflay refer to the agency or to the person of BERGER, and
is important to know in every case in which sense it
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-!

,

is used. In the documents which the opinion cites, the

agency is referred to because the evidence shows, without
dispute, that BERGEH did not sign any of these documents.
some of them were signed by Meurcr, who was his Chlef-ofStaff in prisoner of W0.r affairs, and in charge

office, and who was in the habit of signing BERGSR'S
name to documents involving the agency.

Meurer was a witness for the Prosecution and
conceded tliese facts.

BERGEH bega.n ta.]£ing over tne agency on Ocooo

and had completed a considerable portion of the task by
October 23rd, but the oomplote take-over did not oake

place until about the middle of Hovombor. "^hen BERGER
took over the agency, he took over the personnel of the

agency with him. These were all Wehrmacht men who be
longed to the Armed Forces under Keitel.
BERGER-s first knowledge of the proposal to exe-

0„t. . Prenol, Gen.r.l, o.«e to 1.1. tro. Kootor
1»
H„„.bor. Iloorer, ao a Pro.oootion ,lt».=., tootlflod
to BERGER's reactions as follovjs:
•B.

aoaaitlei

nfcasi wou?a he agree to

the matter carried out.

Further, in cross-examination, he testified.
"Vihen the written
11^^0011 not have
spontaneously '^^^y^^'^^yehatlort; he also
carried out an order of

' ntact Himmler

'^ftter Ca' irnfctssa?y?°would contact

on this matter,

the Fuehrer hlmseli-

i-b.t he did attempt to contact

The evidence shows tha
-62-

Hitler, but that Hitler would not receive him.

Before

he was able to contact Himmler, BERG-ER was injured,

early in the month of November, as a result of being
buried alive in debris in a bombing raid, and was con

fined to the hospital for at least tv/o weeks.

Upen his return from the hospital he inquired of
Meurer what, if anything, had been done about the matter,
and learned that there ha-d been no further developments.

^

He went to Southwest Germany to see Himmler at Friberg.

and finally contacted him at Ulm, and after muca diffi-

culty had an interview with Himmler, in which he protested against this procedure, and apparently Himmler gave

him some encouragement to believe that it would oe aban

doned, and VTTote him a Christmas letter vrhich seemed to
contain such assurance.

Early in January, BERGER had to leave on a business
trip and before leaving told Heurer to keep a sharp look
out and to let him knov;.
j

•

Apparently, he had some appre

hension at the time that the matter was being revived.

V/hile BERGSR vras away, and on the 19th of January, tnis

murder took place. It was accomplished by SS men in Wehr-

f

macht uniforms, while transferring some French Generals
from one camp to another.

The Opinion puts great stress upon the fact that
some of the men in the group were subordinates of BERGER

in the agency. Chief of Prisoner of iar Affs-irs, but
ttiere isn't a suggestion in the evidence that tney acted
upon any order of BERGER's. It must be remembered that
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while these men were suhordlnate to BERG-ER, they were
also subordinate to Keitel and to Himmler, as was
BERGER himself, and that they would naturally act in

accordance with orders originating from that source

regardless of whether they had BERGER's permission
or not»

An unfortunate error seems to have crept into

the opinion^

It quotes BERGER as saying to Meurer, when

i'leurer reported to him on sending in the three names,

that BERGER approved of Keurer's action sa.ying;
• I

w

"because, after all, there are no
possibilities left."

This statement, given as a direct quote from BERGER,
would indicate that BERGER had given up the struggle
and vras determined to make no further resistance, but
this also is not the record.

The witness Meurer testi

fied as follows:

"I informed him of the changes that mean
while occurred, and ho approved my measure?,
because affer all, there were no other pos
sibilities left to me."

^

(Transcript 2375)
This conveys quite a different meaning, and does

I

not suggest that BERGER had given up the struggle.

The

facts appear to be, even as related by the Prosecution
witness Meurer, that BERGER did nothing in the way of

participating in this scheme to murder a French general;
that, on the contrary, he did everything he could do to
prevent the carrying out of such a scheme, even to the

point of advising his office chief that he would have
nothing to do with it.

-•64'

The attit'ude of BERGER to the

execution of this

ordei' to have a French General shot, is fully sho\m
by the testimony to be one of opposition, and as effec

tive opposition as it, was possible for him to exert.
His attitude is further shov/n by the fact that

almost immediately thereafter he heard that Hitler

planned to hold as hostages, certain prominent English
prisoners of war, v7ho v/ere connected with the Royal fam-

^

and BERGER promptly had these prisoners of war
• moved to a point in Germany near the Swiss border, and

from there, on his order, they were taken into Switzer
land and BERGER declared at the time that it was being
done to "prevent a second Mesny affair".

He went to the

- extent of violating Hitler's order, to put prisoners
of war beyond the reach of anyone v;ho sought to carry
out another murder like the Mesny affair.

BERGER's conviction seems to rest uprn the propo

sition that he was unable and unsuccessful in preventing

Hitler, Keitel and Himmler from carrying out this enter
prise.

They v;ere his superiors.

Many lives have been

lost by efforts to prevent these men from carrying out
their will.

gation.

The lav; imposes upon BERGER no such obli

He did expose himself to danger in his opposi

tion, and he did nothing affirmative to aid the action.
I am unable to see any legal basis for the conviction

of BERGER In connection with this unfortunate murder.
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......I

COUNT FIVE

COUIW FIVE charges the defendants therein named
with war crimes and crlmos against hximanityi.

"in that they participated in atrocities and
offenses, including murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, kill

ing of hostages, torture, persecutions on

political, racial and religious grounds, and
other inhumane and criminal acts against

German nationals and members of the civilian

populations of countries and territories under

the belligerent occupation of, or otherwise

controlled by Germany, plunder of public and
private property, wanton destruction of cities,
tovms and villages, and devastation not justi

fied by military necessity,"

The opinion contains a lengthy discussion prelim

inary to the question of guilt of individual defendants.
It seems necessary to refer to it only briefly*

In my judgment, it Is incorrect to say that all
of the German people, except a fe¥/, participated in the

persecution of the Jews, and it is incorrect to say that
the Foreign Office knew of exterminations of the Jewish

people, especially if by the term, "Foreign Office", it
is intended to imply that the Foreign Office defendants

^

here had such knov/ledgo. The evidence, in my opinion,

>

falls far short of supporting any such a conclusion.

A

It is incorrect also, it seems to me, to assume

ij'i

that every reference to the "final solution" of the

I

Jewish question means extermination.
i

The fact Is that

when the first campaigns against the Jews were Inaugurated,

the term, "final solution" came into use. Generally in
the early stages, the final solution meant fcreed emigra
tion, During one period It meant deporting the Jews tj
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Madagascar,

As a res\ilt ot the Wannsee Conference, it

meant deporting them to labor camps in the East.

It never

meant extermination, except to a few of the initiated,

I'he evidence shov/s that tie pron-rcm of extermination

v;as handled with the greatest of secrecy. Hitler orally
instructed and directed Limmler to start tuis action; liimnuer
carerully selected and pledged to secrecy the men who were to

work with him and to carry out these extierminations; places
were selected which v/err isolated, and were comonflacred by
%

being identified with labor camps nearby, and the proi^ram
r

was carried on with the deliberate purpose and desi.gn of pre

venting the German people, and all others not connected with
enterprise, from knowing vjhat was going on. The evidence
by those who v/ere on tie inside of this terrible extermina

tion program strongly tends to show that not over 100 people
in all were informed about the matter,

This is rather eloquently Illustrated by the case of
Fritzsche,

F'ritzsche was a responsible official in the

Fropaganda Ministry.

He gathered news for the press and

made nev/s broadcasts over the radio; his whole activity v/as

to discover the news and know wnat v^as going on, and yet the

f

I^fT found that he did not knov; about these exterminations.
He testified in that case that he had heard rumors;,
that he had asked Goebbcls about the matter and that Ooebbels

V

informed him that it was just foreign propaganda, Under
such circumstances, I do not believe it can be
-67-

.TV-T'

f vat-

assumed, even thoup^h rumors may have been heard,
that the defendants in the Foreign Office, or anyother of the defend<ants, had kno^'-ledgc of these
exterminations at the time they were occurring,

or at any ti. e material uere,

"J-he eviaence cer

tainly fails to shovJ it beyond a rersonable doubt.

Of coursf., they all knovr of them
knows

of them.
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and the vorld

VvEISSAHiCJiiER Ai'C)

vvOi^HilvIAKN

TliG discussion in the Opinion concer-ning
.^iilZSAEGiSER and Vj^OERIvI/iNN,
deals with the
one.

in COUNT FIVE, v.hich

persecution of' the Jews,

is a long

It reveals all of the details of those hor

rors.

I fear it gives the impri^ssion ,that the

Foreign office v/as

the principal agency for the

execution of such policies.

The method of presen

tation should not prevent a calm and logical analy
sis of the entire matter.

The situation deri:ands,

for

a just solution, reason and judgment, not emotion.
I

havv^ discussed sorie of the evidence with

roference to kncwlodge of tins J'oreign Office
defendants of the uxtormination of Jews,

to soiriO

extent in connection v/ith another defendant.

I

will not repeat it her^, but will uxpoct vdnat is
said on that subject in connection Vv'ith the Foreign
Office defendants to apply to all.

Something additional, however, must be said
here.

The nanaling of the so-called . Jev/ish question

was vested by hitler ex.clusively in hirmoler and his
SS,

The limited field in which jii'IilZSAECiCEiR and hOLRfclANN

might exercise a veto, on proposed Jewish measures,
will be later discussed.

i»vith roforenco to the

question of knowledge on the part of ABIZSnZCi'JiL-i
and wOEHihUTJ, the Opinion cites the entire record
of the Jewish persecutions.

These .
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persecutions increased in intensity as the years went by.
ioc tor minations, did not become a significant part of the
program until about the middlb ' of 1942 and laost of the

exterminations took place during the last two years of
the war.

ihe Opinion cites the hinsatzgruppen reports as
charg?,rig .•iihXZSi--ECiChd and

with knowledge of them.

These reports arc those of the SS units engaged in behindtho-line activities in hussia, and as a part of the war

against iiussia.
1941.

But that war did not start until Jure ,

Btrangc t.s it niay seom, the incidents on which

vvE,IZSjr^ECj:lBR and i.-OERi'liKK are convicted, are events Vihich

happened in June or July, 1942, before they are shown 'to

have had notice of these horrible things having happen
ed, so that obviously, WhlZSAECICBR and

could not

be charged with having noted with K:iiov;ledge of such events.
leoreover,

i t must be romeiabereo that both

and WOhHi;UhN left uermany in 1943.
Riooontrop.

J^oth were demoted by

'.'i/LIZS.j.hGK£H v.^as sent to the. Vatican, -and

•jiiOERlvl/xdlT to China, so at the time the worst persecutions
took place, th^y were-not even in the, country.
Opinion cites the testimony of vvhJZS.^ECiffih

son.

•

It fails to shov/ that ViiEIZSAECKER had knov:ledge of any syste
matic exterminations at any time.

it shows only that he

know oi Individual deaths, and that he could not understand

them,

nut even mortj iniportaut than that, there is no time

fixed in the. son's testimony as to when his father heard of

these deaths, whether a-f; thu beginning, in the middle, or
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at tho end of the war.
worthless

The testimony of the son quoted Is

on that account.

There is nothing to impeaoh WEIZSAECKER'S testimony

about v/hat he know.

Certainly it is not impeached by

the kind of facts referred to in tho Opinion.

Moreover,

i t is indicated in the Opinion that YJEIZSAECKER has some

responsibility for what was done by Luthcr and Rndemacher

of the Poroign Office, whoso activities are extensively
quoted in tho Opinion.
Ribbentrop testified before tne IMT tnat he set

f
*

up a department in tho Foreign Office to carry out Party

programs.
land".

That was tho Department, "G-crmany" or "Deutsch-

It was directly subordinate to Ribbentrop,

reported to him and received its instructions from him.
Neither VvEIZSAECKER nor WCERMiANN had anything to do with
it.

Vi/lth some of these Irrolovancios out of the v^ray, what

was the picture?

Vlien the first action against Jews in

Germany began, and Jev/s were required to register their

property, the Foreign Office recoivod many protests from
Foreign Governments based on the grounds that Jev/ish

Nationals of those governments residing in Germany were
required to register their property.

VffilZSAECr^h Immed

iately conferred v/lth the governmental department that

was handling Jev/ish matters, and succeeded-in having all
lows of Foreign Nationality rollevod of this requirement,
and an exception made in their favor.

Later-tbe general

exception seems to have been lost, as pressure against the

Jev/s increased, but the Foreign office as roprosentod by
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WEIZSAECKER /-xND WOERMA.M, continued to insist that it be con

sulted whenever any action against Jews of foreign nationality
was cqntemplatod.

The object, of course, viras to enable the

Foreign Office to satisfy the reasonable demands of foreign
governments, and to cultivate good relations with such for

eign governments, and to prevent anything from happening which
would produce bad international relations•

This wes a matter

of forcisn relations or forcia:n politics which wr^s their par

ticular responsibility and gave thorn a right to be heard,

^

and that ri^t was accorded thorn. Thus, when it was proposed
to deport Jews from Holland, the Foreign Office was consult-

^

ed, WEIZSAECKER objected that since Sweden was the protective
power for Holland, it v/ould not only have the right to object
but the right to inspect the places vjhero those people wore

housed, and that if It were discovered that thoy . had been
removed from Holland, the results v/ould not bo good so far
as the relations v^ith Sweden v;ere concerned.

Vihen It came to the proposal to deport Jews from

Prance, WEIZSAECKER objected vigorously to the deportation
of Jev/s of American nationality on the groiand that such
of American nationals would lead to bad inter

national relations vrith America,

^

Fe could not object on

that ground to the deportation of other Jews of foreign
nationality, because the governments of nations of which

they were nationals, had agreed to their deportation.
'i

But

this action of I'-EIZSAECKER'S v/as overruled by Ribbentrop,
and American Jews were deported«
When it came to deporting French and stateless
Jews, a deportation for which wEIZSAEGl^R and \/OERIvlANN

are convicted, the Foreign Office had no legitimate
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grounds to object.

France agreed to the deportations,

the Jews were stateless.

No grounds, thorefoi-o, based

on foreign politics existed for objection.
sent meant no more than that.

I'heir con

If bEIZSAECKLK'S objec

tion made on good grounds concerning AmericTi Jevrs, v/as

to bo overruled, v^hat possible grounds could bo urged
against the deportation of these French and stateless
Jews so far as foreign politics were concerned?
so-called consent of

^

So the

.EIZSAECKEK and of WOERMANN was

merely the recognition of a fact thati- conditions woro ab
sent vi^hich gave them a right to object on the grounds •of

^

foreign politics.

But the Opinion seems to hold, espec

ially as to WEXZSAECKER, that even in such a situation,
he should have taken advantage of the opportunity to
deliver a lecture to Ribbentrop on International La\/ and
on morality,

such a sentiment fails, it seems to me, to appre

ciate the realities of the situation prevailing in the Reich,

and the personality of Ribbentrop.

doing the lecturing.

was in the habit of

For nn underling who he had recently

overruled, to attempt to lecture him, certainly wo\ild have

done no good, and it might have done a lot of harm. Il*

^

MIZSAECKER could not prevent Ribbentrop from deporting
Jews of American nationality, on the ground that it might
disturb international relations, how could ho expect to

interest him in non-deportation of Jews on grounds of gen

eral morality? But I do not see how either of "these men
can he convicted for such an ovcrsi^-t in any event, and

failure to preach morality is not a crime, - at least not
one charged in the Indictment, or provided lor in Control
Coiincil Law 10.
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I am unable to grasp the significance of the other

incificnt cited against ^rJEIZSAECFER concernin/? employees
of diplomatic corps.

I understand that the terroa "Diplo

matic Corps" includes all people employed by the govern

ment, Virhich maintains the mission, and for the purpose

of carrying out the functions of the mission.

The dis

pute has reference to people personally employed by such

members, as for instance, household help in their homes.
If m.y interpretation is correct, it seems to me

i

that Vi/EIZ.S/.ECI®R *s opinion v/as correct.

But whether it

was or not, there is nothing to indicate that it was.not

^

given in good faith, and honest.

A mistake in the inter-

prctction or application of the law, fortunately, is not
a

crime,

. I sec no justification for holding h'EIZSAECKER or
•'GERMAN'''^ guilty of persecution of the Jews in connection
V7ith the matters recited in the Opinion.

The deportation

of these Jews was in the hands of the SS or the occupying
forces in Prance,

The Foreign Office, as represented by

WEIZSAEGKER and 'AOERI/AWN, had a limited right of objec
tion as to Jews of Foreign nationality.

They seem to

have exorcised that right wherever it was available,

^

V.here it v/as not a vailable, they had no grounds for objcction.

That is the oxtent of

their consent, to con

vict them, is to punish them for the acts of another
I

department of government, which they did not order, and
which they were powerlt-ss to prevent.
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STEPNGhAOHT is chargod in sub-pr;rngr-".ph 42 of
the

Indictment;

"42.
Innocent members of the civilian
population of the occupied countries not con

nected with any acts against the occupying
power were taken as hostages and, v/ithout

benefit of investigation or trial, vjere sum
marily deported, hanged or shot. These inno
cent victims V7erc executed or deported at
arbitrarily established ratios for attacks
by person or persons unknown, on German
installations and German personnel in the
occupied territory.
In many cases the
recommendation and approval of the German

Foreign Office with the participation of
STEP:NGP(ACHT and others were required
prior to the exec.itibn of ticse measures

and the necessary aiploiriatic 'cove,r-up'
was effected to cunceal txie naLuro ui

tiese

crimes•"

"48,

-> Since by far t^^c p-renter fart of

the victims of this gcnocidal prnprr"" wore
nationals of puppet anct satellite countries
dominated by the 'fhird neich, the German
J'orexgn Office, through the defendants •J'-a
STELNCtIJ!.uKT(and others) foi'ced these
governments to deport persons of Jewish
extraction within treir countries to

German extermination camps in the East,

and directed and controlled the execu
tion of these measures,

It will be observed that in the first paragraph

STEMGFiACKT is charged with .approving deportations and
in the second with forcinp deportations.
1

A.re.ading of the Opinion reveals that STEi^i^GiUibiiT

is not convicted on either of these o;rounds, and that

the reason for his conviction is r.-motc from any state
ment contained in tne oiil oi iarticuiars against him.
As previously pointed out, it is my view that

Iri'-Uctments should mean something and t^at no defendant
should be convicted except upon a charge contf-ined in
the bill of tarticulara.
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But that iaside, the things on vhich STEBNGiiAGKT
is convicted do not, In my opinion, constitute a crime

against humanity at all,

tor that reason it seems to

me unnecessary to go into, the question of v;hether

all

of the findings of fact contained in the opinion are
justified.

Assuming that they art: justified by the evidence,
no crime against hur.ianity appears.

iivhat appears in the facts, as found by the
Tribunal, is the following:

(1) 'fhat on hih""ientrop' s order, ST'^^'^^^'^rACFT
organized an office-for anti-J^^^'ish
action abroad;

(2) That a card index of Jows abroad was pre

pared and presented to him;

(3) That a memorandum v;a.s presented to him
recomr ending violent action against- the
Jews in lud-pest; that he referred this

.to the hinister at B-ud-pest, who disapproved

it, and nothing came of the matter. Tne
subsequent action against Jews in i;)udap6st
"had no connection with SThhiiCriiiiCxiT', and is
not ciaitri.ed to have nad;

(4) j-e advised the Svedish Ihvoy that he v;as not
competent to de-l

-Oanish questions.

Eg was legally correct,

'^he opinion sug

gests he should have shcvm sympathy.
(5) Severra reports and memorandums wert. pre

pared in the Foreign Office, one with
reference to the deport;: tlon of Jews in

Greece, particularly in the Salonika area,
but this appears to have exempted JQv/s of
for6i,an nationality, "^hose governments
had

not

consented
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to

the

deportation,

, and this was the only competency that

STEEhGltACHT, or the Eoreif^n Office, had
In the Jevrish question;

(6) There v^as extensive ccrreEpondGnce had and
memoranda and reports made in an eriort to

permit some JgVi/ish cxii-Ldren to eaixsrate.
The original request was to permit them to
emic^r'te to ialcstine.

This could not be

ione under the German policy prevailing at
the time.

The German Government vjas court

ing tie Arabs; the Mtjfti of Jerusalem v/as
in Germany.

Germany hoped to make contact

vjxth the Arab world and to conclude an

alliance with it, and did not want to risk

displeasing the Arabs by sending Jews to
ialestlne.

'•^'his

was a high-level decision

which STELMGKAC^ T did not make and could

not violate.

There v/ere some negotiations

with a view of having them taken to Jingland

and various reports -nu meinoranda wero pre

pared on the subject until iLibbentrop
stopred the whole business,
(7) STK"R^^GF;AC''-''T wired
to make an effort to

l^ri^atlon at Bucharest
ave the ^'•umanlan

Government cancel its permit for the Jews

to emigrate to lalestlne, in order to bring
its policy in accordance with the German
policy.
It is transactions of this type that are the

basis of the conviction of STEANCtLACBT, and particularly
negotiations concerning permissions to emigrate.

The

opinion, after describing tlese documrnts, states In the
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two final parorrrphs, tie conclusions with reference
to them as foiiows;

'•It would be difficult to conceive of a more
flarrant had faith than tb^^t vhicb was car
ried out in these nep-otiptiuns .
"ere at
least is one (^ccas ionwhere Eibhentrop, as

.'

Foreign Minister, asked for advice of bis
Foreign Office. Here was the opportunity
for the Foreign Office and its State Secre-

tary to give good advice instead of bad; to
point out hov; the improvement in German for
eign relations and its rehabilitation in the
eyes of the world would be possible by at
least permitting children to be saved from

extermination; but every step which the For

eign Office took, every recommendation that

1*

it\ia.de, was directed to block efforts made
"by leading countries, of the v/orld, neutral

^

as v/ell as anemy states, to permit little
children to come unto them and to defeat the
efforts of the good Snmaritans, and turn

their offers into Ihasi pr opr.g.anda . "

(

' "STEINGKACFT was a party to this; he must
bear the responsibility- He should be and
fs held GHIITX under COWT ElVE.'*

Ihls snowii i-rttty clearly tnat sa'l,r,iiviruiCi:iT' S guilt
consists in nis lailurt to rtf..d a moral lecture to

Kibbcntror. It is unnoceEsarv to sreculate as to 'ffhetbcr or not be sboulci bcve Hone so, rnH wbat the effect
would have been if he had. It, Is only necessary to

point out that his failure to do so is not a Crime

against Humanity charged in tl e Indictment and defined
in Control Council -^ow 10,

^

The opinion in this, and in the case of other
defendants in this Count, seems to me to ignore the

definition of Crimes against Eumanity as cont..ined

the la w, and to proceed upon the theory that anything
which a defendant may have done, which fails to meet
the personal apfrovd of the v,rlter of the opinion, as

to wh.at constitutes proper oonauct, is uCrime ag..inst
humanity.
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